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COMMENTS
TEXT AND PRETEXT: THE FUTURE OF
MATERIAL WITNESS DETENTION AFTER
ASHCROFT V. AL-KIDD
CATHERINE CONE∗
The Supreme Court, in its 2011 decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, closed the door
under the Fourth Amendment on a material witness’s ability to argue that the
government pretextually held the witness for individual investigation rather than for
testimony in an upcoming criminal proceeding. Although traditionally pretext was
raised as a Fourth Amendment argument, a material witness can also claim pretext
under the federal material witness statute by arguing that detaining officers did not
comply with the statute, and thus, avoid the constitutional argument altogether. In
al-Kidd, the Court did not address whether a material witness can instead argue
pretext through the federal material witness statute directly.
Regardless of whether the country is in the immediate aftermath of an attack on its
national security, like the 9/11 attacks, or in peacetime, the concerns that arose in
relation to witnesses who were pretextually held following 9/11 are equally applicable.
These concerns relate to the justification of a witness’s incarceration and include the
government’s misrepresentation of how “material” a witness actually is to a criminal
proceeding and the genuine flight risk a material witness poses.
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To protect against the reality of these concerns, courts should read a higher
standard into the federal material witness statute before authorizing a warrant to
detain a material witness. Today, in order to detain a material witness pursuant to
the statute, the government must meet the plain terms of the materiality and
impracticability requirements; however, courts have not definitively determined the
evidentiary standard used to assess whether those terms have been met. Therefore, the
door is still open for discussion concerning the evidentiary burden the government
should be required to meet to legally detain a material witness under the statute.
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“There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder
1
of it.”
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that following a recent executive order authorizing the
use of limited force in Syria, Reuters and the Associated Press
confirm that an Iranian terrorist cell is lending support to Bashar alAssad and planning an attack on U.S. soil. Within days of the alleged
order, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) detains an Iranian
man, a community college student who left Iran some years ago and
currently resides in San Diego, California. FBI agents claim that the
student must be detained as a material witness for the upcoming trial
of a suspected Iranian terrorist. The government supports the
detention by pointing to a piece of paper found in the terrorist’s car,
which bears both the terrorist’s name and the student’s old phone
number.
The government also indicates that the student’s
continuing ties to Iran and his unwillingness to come forward and
share information regarding the terrorist further suggest that he is a
flight risk. The student is arrested, and weeks later, he has yet to be
called as a witness.
Although hypothetical, this story closely
1. Letter from John Dalberg-Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (April 5,
1887), in HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND STUDIES 503, 504 (John Neville Figgis & Reginald
Vere Laurence eds., 1907).
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resembles the case of Osama Awadallah, a student who was held as a
2
material witness in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
The federal material witness statute authorizes a judge to order the
arrest of an individual whose testimony “is material in a criminal
proceeding . . . if it is shown that it may become impracticable to
3
secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” Material witnesses
enjoy the same constitutional right to pretrial release as other federal
4
detainees, and federal law requires a material witness’s release if his
testimony “can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further
5
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.” Typically,
a material witness challenging his detention will claim that the arrest
amounted to an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment
because the purpose of the arrest was not to use the witness for
testimony in another case, but was instead to hold him as a suspected
6
criminal. Thus, the detainee’s argument looks to the subjective
intent of the arresting officer in claiming that the detention was
7
pretextual.
While the Fourth Amendment is most commonly
invoked by material witness detainees arguing pretext, it is no longer
8
an effective legal argument that detainees have at their disposal. A
2. See United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah II), 349 F.3d 42, 45–49 (2d Cir.
2003) (explaining that Osama Awadallah was arrested after the 9/11 attacks when
federal agents searched a car that belonged to one of the hijackers of the plane that
crashed into the Pentagon and found a piece of paper that read, “Osama 589-5316,”
which was used to track down a San Diego address where Awadallah lived). On this
evidence, the court considered Awadallah to be a flight risk and issued a warrant for
his detention. Id. at 47.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
4. To be as factually accurate as possible, this Comment refers to a material
witness’s rights through “he/his/him” terminology because the majority of the cases
referenced involve male material witnesses’ experiences. However, this Comment
intends to show prospectively that any proposed application of the federal material
witness statute equally applies to male and female witnesses.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
6. See James E. Mosimann, Note, Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft: Clearly Established
Confusion, 96 IOWA L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2010) (observing that Fourth Amendment
subjective intent arguments claiming pretextual detention fail where the government
is able to provide an objective reason for the action under Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996)); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 17–25
(2005) [hereinafter HRW REPORT] (describing the U.S. government’s continued
practice of holding individuals suspected of terrorism through the material witness
statute when the government lacked probable cause to hold witnesses on individual
charges).
7. See HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 18–19 (referencing Michael Chertoff’s
admission that he, along with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and other
architects of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategy routinely held material
witnesses for criminal investigation rather than for use as a witness in an unrelated
criminal proceeding).
8. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (reasoning that “not a
single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively reasonable
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material witness can also claim that detention is illegally pretextual
under the material witness statute by arguing that the detaining
officers did not comply with the terms of the statute in seeking the
detention. Claiming pretext under the material witness statute avoids
9
the constitutional argument altogether.
Even though material witnesses are no longer being detained in as
great a number as they were immediately following the 9/11 attacks,
pretextual use of the material witness statute is still relevant today
because similar security issues that might motivate the government to
detain individuals as material witnesses could arise in the future.
Under those circumstances, it is plausible that the government could
once again seek to detain material witnesses to bypass the more
rigorous standards required to charge an individual with a specific
10
crime. Moreover, the issues relevant to the detention of material
witnesses who were pretextually held immediately following 9/11
equally apply to material witnesses who are pretextually held today.
These issues include the government’s misrepresentation of how
“material” a witness is to a criminal proceeding, the actual flight risk
that a material witness poses, the witness’s liberty interest, and the
court’s interest in conserving judicial resources.
This Comment argues that courts should condition the validity of
warrants on clear and convincing evidence under the material
witness statute because doing so would protect the witness’s
significant liberty interest and help screen for instances of improper
motive. In addition to utilizing the clear and convincing standard,
conducting periodic status hearings would help to further minimize
the pretextual use of the material witness statute because these
measures combined would allow courts to regularly and thoroughly
scrutinize the government’s proffered reasons for continued
detention. This Comment explains why the federal material witness
statute is the appropriate avenue to challenge pretextual detention
of material witnesses.

arrest pursuant to a material witness warrant unconstitutional”); infra Part I.A.4
(noting that arguments about pretext have largely been foreclosed because courts
employ an objective standard in this analysis).
9. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2087–88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(implying that the Court did not explore whether the material witness statute itself
was used as a pretext to detain al-Kidd as a suspected terrorist because the Court
presumed al-Kidd was held under a validly obtained material witness warrant).
10. See infra Part I.B (illustrating how the events of 9/11, which resulted in an
uptick in material witness arrests for individuals, who at times never testified but
were later charged with a crime, could set a precedent for future breaches of
national security).
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Part I provides an overview of the material witness statute,
including a discussion of the statute’s interpretive case law and the
post-9/11 change in application of material witness detention that led
11
to Ashcroft v. al-Kidd. Part I concludes by drawing analogies from the
civil detention and equal protection contexts where courts apply
higher evidentiary and judicial review standards because of the
significant individual interests at stake. These analogies create three
illustrations: (1) the clear and convincing standard affords greater
protections to the civilly detained during initial determination and
periodic review hearings; (2) heightened levels of judicial review
monitors against pretext in equal protection cases; and (3)
continuing challenges to the government demanding more
accountability for illegal civil detentions or unequal and dissimilar
treatment can yield parallel safeguards in the material witness
context.
Part II builds on these borrowed standards to show that a court
determining whether to detain a material witness can similarly
require a higher standard of proof from the government in any
application for a material witness warrant or petition for continued
detention.
Specifically, courts should grant the government’s
application for a material witness warrant only where the government
has provided clear and convincing evidence — the standard used in
civil detention cases—in order to protect the witness’s liberty
interest. Part II then discusses how using a heightened standard of
review to assess the validity of material witness warrants helps detect
improper motive by more readily smoking out pretext and protects
against unnecessary and harmful deference to government interests
at the expense of both the witness and the court. Additional judicial
oversight of material witness detention can also ensure that the
government is using the least restrictive means to detain material
witnesses and is not falsely misrepresenting the reasons why it is
appropriate to continue holding the witness. Finally, Part II
recommends that courts move away from the era of great deference
to government interests, which this Comment suggests can be
accomplished through greater checks on prosecutorial and
governmental abuse and through new governmental standards of
sufficiency as to materiality and impracticability.

11. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
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BACKGROUND

A. The Federal Material Witness Statute: Origins, Purpose, and Practice
The government’s authority to arrest and detain material witnesses
was the long-standing tradition under English Law, dating back to the
12
founding of the United States. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
that a witness whose testimony was found to be necessary by the court
13
could be detained and imprisoned. The power to actually detain a
witness developed as a necessary consequence of the establishment of
14
a compulsory process for the appearance of material witnesses.
Today, the federal material witness statute gives courts the power to
exercise discretion in determining whether to incarcerate witnesses
who refuse to testify, even when the arrest is not preceded by a
15
subpoena.
The “duty to disclose knowledge of a crime” is so essential that
Congress developed a practice of allowing for detention of material
16
witnesses even when the knowing party is innocent. As one court
has described,
[a] material witness is subject to detention not because he is
suspected of a crime, but because he has knowledge of a crime, and
because there is adequate doubt whether he will attend the
trial . . . . The goal is the presentation at trial of the material
17
knowledge possessed by the witness.

12. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Francisco
M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 802 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Bacon, 449 F.2d at 938–39); see
also Donald Q. Cochran, Material Witness Detention in a Post-9/11 World: Mission Creep
or Fresh Start?, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (discussing that under the common
law of England, the King’s subjects owed service of knowledge and discovery, which
encompassed a duty to testify to material information).
13. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (stating that “the
recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case; which
recognizances the magistrate before whom the examination shall be, may require on
pain of imprisonment”); see also Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention
in American Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85, 136 (2011) (quoting the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and describing the obligation to testify before a court).
14. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802 (explaining that the duty to
provide testimony necessitated a correlating authority to detain to ensure a witness’s
testimony where he might not otherwise appear and testify); see also Barry v. United
States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 617 (1929); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 279–80 (1919) (elaborating that as early as 1612, the King of England declared
that his subjects were required to provide the sovereign with information when it was
requested).
15. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 69 (2002) (indicating that a court may detain and
imprison a material witness if there is a reasonable belief that the witness will not
appear at the suspect’s trial).
16. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 184 (1953)).
17. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
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Congress developed the federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144, to effectuate the use of a material witness’s testimony at trial.
1.

18 U.S.C. § 3144
The federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, provides that
a court may order the detention of a material witness only upon
certain showings by the government that (1) “the testimony of [the]
person is material in a criminal proceeding;” and (2) it is
18
“impracticable to secure” the witness’s presence by subpoena. A
court assessing materiality asks whether the facts underlying the
material arrest warrant, which are set forth in the government’s
affidavit, establish probable cause to believe that the detainee had
19
information that is material to a trial or grand jury proceeding.
When a court cannot determine whether a witness’s testimony would
be material, rather than merely cumulative of other witnesses’
testimony or impeachment evidence, the government fails to
20
demonstrate materiality. As to impracticability, a detaining officer
must demonstrate to the court that the circumstances surrounding
detention of the material witness made it truly impracticable to
21
secure the witness by subpoena.
The court’s impracticability
determination is based on whether the witness poses a high risk of
22
flight. The impracticability showing in an application for a material
witness warrant under the federal material witness statute must be
23
based on probable cause, as is required for materiality.
The federal material witness statute also requires that government
officials secure a material witness’s participation in future criminal
proceedings through the least restrictive means possible, whether
that be by issuing a subpoena or by deposing the witness ahead of the

18. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
19. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70 (noting that courts adopt a totality of the
circumstances approach when assessing materiality).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d 303, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(explaining that the testimony of two unidentified witnesses in an organized crime
case was not sufficient for the judge to issue a warrant securing their presence at trial
because there was not enough known about the witnesses and simply no showing that
their testimony would be material to the case).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3144; see also Basciano, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 335–36 (finding that the
government did not meet its burden of demonstrating impracticability because
without the identity of the witnesses, the court could only speculate as to whether it
would be practicable to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial through a subpoena).
22. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 618 (1929)
(“[W]here suspicions exist that a witness may disappear, or be spirited away, before
trial, in criminal cases, . . . he may be held . . . to appear at the trial . . . .”).
23. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 64; Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942–43
(9th Cir. 1971).
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24

criminal proceedings.
The federal material witness statute
recommends that the government use the least restrictive means
possible because the government should only deprive a material
witness of a liberty interest through arrest and detention as a last
25
resort. Nonetheless, based on the power conferred by the federal
material witness statute, a court can employ its judgment in deciding
whether to issue an arrest warrant without first requiring a
26
subpoena.
Additionally, the statute applies to material witnesses
whose testimony will be used at any criminal proceeding, and thus
27
encompasses both grand jury indictments and criminal trials.
2.

Challenging detention through 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Once a material witness has been detained pursuant to a material
witness warrant, the witness is to be treated under a second statute
that addresses the release or detention of defendants pending trial,
28
18 U.S.C. § 3142. Section 3142 sets forth the witness’s right to a
hearing following detention:
The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any
condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure
the appearance of such person as required . . . upon motion of the
attorney for the Government or upon the judicial officer’s own
motion in a case, that involves . . . a serious risk that such person
29
will flee . . . .

24. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
25. See id. (exemplifying how material witness detention can only be prolonged if
the witness cannot be deposed and only to “prevent a failure of justice” in
recognition of the material witness’s liberty interest); Heidee Stoller et al.,
Developments in Law and Policy: The Costs of Post-9/11 National Security Strategy, 22 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 202 (2004).
26. United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Bacon, 449
F.2d at 939).
27. See In re Application of the U.S. for a Material Witness Warrant, Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3144, for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
[hereinafter Material Witness Warrant for John Doe] (clarifying that the Bacon court
interpreted the statute to include grand jury witnesses and explaining that the Bacon
court’s language was in turn incorporated in the revised and current statute); see also
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 55 (holding that “[w]hen Congress enacted § 3144 . . .
there was a settled view that a grand jury proceeding is a ‘criminal proceeding’ for
purposes of the material witness statute” and thus applying the statute to both trial
and grand jury witnesses); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 230–31 (7th Cir.
1982) (confirming that Oliver was properly detained under the statute because a
responsible government official provided that Oliver’s testimony was material to a
grand jury proceeding).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (establishing that material witnesses are to be treated in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3142).
29. See id. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (indicating that a detained witness’s hearing must
be held immediately upon the witness’s initial appearance before an officer of
the court).
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The hearing serves as a valuable procedural safeguard for witnesses
because the government is required to inform the detainee of the
reasons for the detention, and the detainee is allowed the
30
opportunity to challenge the detention.
Underscoring the importance of a material witness’s post-detention
31
hearing, the court noted in United States v. Feingold that the witness is
entitled to present additional information to a judicial officer to
32
arrange the conditions of his release.
At this hearing, the “full
factual picture can be developed, thereby protecting [the witness]
33
against any possible abuse of the arrest power by the Government.”
34
Similarly, in Adams v. Hanson, the court was deeply troubled that the
witness was not provided such a hearing and thus had no opportunity
35
to be heard. The court found that the lack of a hearing violated the
witness’s rights, particularly because the judicial process is intended
36
to provide a check on prosecutorial abuse. Courts weigh a host of
interests at these hearings: (1) the materiality of the testimony,
including whether the witness’s testimony is cumulative; (2) the
length of proposed detention —the longer the detention, the greater
the showing required by the state to justify it; (3) the harm to the
witness and the witness’s family, including lost wages and missed

30. Id.
31. 416 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
32. Id. at 629. The court gleaned this right from the former federal witness
legislation, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984). Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at
629.
33. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 629; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (providing the
witness with the opportunity to exercise his right “to testify, to present witnesses, to
cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by
proffer or otherwise” through a full evidentiary hearing, unlike ex parte hearings
where material witness warrants are granted); Cochran, supra note 12, at 6 (observing
that § 3142 affords detainees a number of “procedural safeguards,” including the
right to proffer testimony and evidence and to present and cross-examine witnesses).
Many states have instituted similar practices. See, e.g., Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d
397, 406 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that despite the demand of the Michigan material
witness statute, the defendant did not have the opportunity to be heard at the postdetention hearing because the court failed to “provide a witness the opportunity to
be heard and to assess itself the materiality of her testimony and the likelihood that .
. . [the witness] would fail to appear”); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 806–
07 (Ct. App. 2001) (specifying that when a court considers whether to order a
witness to appear or face judicial consequences, the court should take into account a
non-exhaustive list of factors, such as “[t]he nature of the charges in the underlying
criminal prosecution” and “[t]he length of the proposed detention”).
34. 656 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2011).
35. Id. at 406.
36. Id. at 406, 410; see also In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 805–06 (noting
that the initial hearing entitles the witness to notice of the basis on which detention
is sought and the right to dispute the allegations providing for his detention).
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classes; (4) the witness’s financial resources, particularly in setting
37
bail; and (5) other alternatives to incarceration.
Another valuable safeguard for any material witness is the habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, because as detained individuals,
38
material witnesses fall under the statute’s ambit. This statute offers a
material witness the opportunity to have a court determine whether
the witness can continue to be held because the statute applies to
categories of individuals, including those who are needed in court to
39
testify. For example, José Padilla, a post-9/11 detainee arrested on
suspicion of plotting a dirty bomb, questioned his continued
detention pursuant to a material witness warrant by filing a habeas
corpus petition; Padilla’s petition prompted the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to hold that the President lacked the
authority to indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen, who was arrested in the
40
United States, as a material witness.
3.

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 15 and 46
Similar to the habeas corpus statute, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure —regarding depositions—establishes an
additional safeguard for potential material witnesses by providing
that an individual may be detained only if the individual cannot be
deposed, and additionally sets forth the parameters for deposing
41
detainees. However, depositions are not taken as a matter of right;
42
instead, depositions are only granted in exceptional situations.
37. In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806–07.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
39. Id. § 2241(c)(5).
40. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the President
does not have the authority to detain a material witness seized outside of a combat
zone), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also STEPHANIE COOPER BLUM, THE NECESSARY EVIL
OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR 100–01 (2008) (detailing that the
Second Circuit held that the President did not have the authority to indefinitely detain
José Padilla as an enemy combatant, but that the Supreme Court reversed the decision
based on a technicality). For an overview of José Padilla’s detention, see Jose Padilla,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/p/jose_padilla/index.html.
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15; see also United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009,
1989 WL 39685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (finding that securing the witness’s
testimony would be impracticable under the material witness statute because he was a
Uruguayan citizen scheduled to leave the United States well in advance of the
defendant’s trial, but nonetheless granting the witness’s request that his testimony be
taken by deposition because his case was exceptional and presented due process and
humanitarian considerations).
42. See United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating
that depositions are meant to safeguard testimony, not “provide a method of pretrial
discovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ismaili, 828 F.2d
153, 159 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that the 1975 amendment to Rule 15(a)
provides a stricter standard for depositions in criminal cases than for depositions in
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Furthermore, it is the party requesting the deposition, rather than
the government, that must prove that “exceptional circumstances”
43
require that the testimony be taken through a deposition.
Depositions are intended to facilitate the underlying goal of the
material witness statute—detaining material witnesses using the least
restrictive means possible. For this reason, reading the federal
material witness statute in conjunction with Rule 15 provides that the
witness must be released unless the deposition would not serve as an
adequate substitute for live testimony, such that the deposition would
44
result in a “failure of justice.”
For example, if a defendant was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses or
compel witnesses in his favor, then allowing that material witness to
testify via deposition rather than appearing in court would violate his
constitutional rights and equate to a failure of justice that allows for
45
continued detention of a material witness.
Additionally, material witnesses can avail themselves of Rule 46 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires the
government to issue bi-weekly reports to the court stating its reasons
for holding any material witness for more than ten days pending
46
indictment, arraignment, or trial. The rule affords each witness the
ability to have a court exercise continuing supervision over his
detention for the purpose of “eliminating all unnecessary
47
48
detention” through periodic hearings.
At the hearing, the
government must provide the court with a report on each material
witness held in its custody for more than ten days whose testimony

civil cases, whereby depositions for criminal cases can be taken only under
exceptional circumstances, subject to the trial court’s discretion).
43. Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1124.
44. See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
deposition testimony is not a first measure but a last resort, allowable only after the
government exhausted reasonable efforts to assure the witness’s presence at trial).
45. United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also id. at
949 (stating that courts reading Rule 15 in conjunction with the material witness
statute should deny a request for testimony by deposition only where a failure of
justice would ensue); id. at 951 (proposing that whether material witnesses are called
for the defense as opposed to the government weighs heavily in determining whether
it is appropriate for material witness testimony to be taken by deposition).
46. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2) (implementing additional checks on the
government’s prolonged detention of material witnesses).
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1).
48. See Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(g) (amended 2002) (current version at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 46(h)(1))).
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is still pending and must give reasons why the witness should not
49
be released.
4.

The Fourth Amendment
A material witness may challenge pretextual detention on
50
constitutional grounds under the Fourth Amendment. However,
the Supreme Court has foreclosed any argument that might be made
regarding pretextual seizures under the Fourth Amendment because
the inquiry governing the validity of a search or seizure is objective,
51
not subjective.
Despite the objective nature of the inquiry, the
constitutional question is still raised with regards to whether an
52
individual is detained without reasonable, objective grounds.
Because the material witness’s ability to argue against his detention
53
on constitutional grounds is largely foreclosed, this Comment
instead encourages questioning the validity of the underlying
material witness warrant and any accompanying pretext under the
federal material witness statute.
B. Shifting Calculus: Post-9/11 Material Witness Detention and Its
Application in Federal Courts
While, in theory, meeting the statutory requirements for material
witness detention is intended to apply uniformly, in practice, events
affecting the nation’s security altered the application of the federal
54
material witness statute. Following 9/11, the number of detainees
49. See id. (expressing that the government is required to report on the status of
each witness even if the government wishes to take the witness’s testimony by
deposition).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing for the “right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”).
51. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (establishing that the
relevant question is whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the
challenged] action”); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)
(explaining that reasonableness inquiries are “predominantly . . . objective
inquir[ies]” rather than subjective ones); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814
(1996) (clarifying that so long as the government’s actions viewed objectively are
justified, then they are reasonable “whatever the subjective intent” that motivated the
relevant officials).
52. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that an individual “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable,
objective grounds for doing so” because doing so violates the Fourth Amendment).
53. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137 (establishing that “[t]he scheme of the Fourth
Amendment becomes meaningful only when . . . the conduct of those charged with
enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge”).
54. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 8–14 (discussing the government’s shift in its
practice of detaining material witnesses after 9/11 to meet the ends of incapacitating
and investigating terrorists through preventive detention); Bradley A. Parker,
Comment, Abuse of the Material Witness: Suspects Detained as Witnesses in Violation of the
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55

held as material witnesses rose sharply.
The FBI began using
material witness warrants to detain dozens of people suspected of
being connected to the hijackers, a practice that led to an eighty
56
percent increase in material witness arrests from 2000 to 2002. Prior
to the attacks, the government typically used material witness
warrants to hold individuals suspected of criminal activity for which
57
probable cause had not been established.
After 9/11, the
government used material witness warrants to detain people whom
the government suspected had participated in terrorist-related
58
crime. Moreover, because material witnesses were being held for
individual investigations, many of those detained were never asked to
59
testify.
Federal district and appellate courts sitting in New York and
Virginia were among the first courts to apply the federal material
60
witness statute following the 9/11 attacks. These courts navigated
uncharted waters when they confronted material witness detention
issues connected to national security and terrorism. Beginning in the
district courts, judges routinely determined whether to detain
material witnesses connected to post-9/11 investigations by assessing
the government’s position as to the materiality and impracticability of
61
securing witnesses through means other than arrest. Additionally,
Fourth Amendment, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 22, 24–26 (2009) (indicating that the
government used the material witness statute as part of a new strategy following the
9/11 terrorist attacks to detain and investigate possible terrorists).
55. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 10 (reporting that the American Civil Liberties
Union and Human Rights Watch’s combined research showed that at least seventy
individuals were detained as material witnesses out of the 134 detained on federal
criminal charges); Parker, supra note 54, at 24–26 (confirming the trend cited in the
Human Rights Watch’s findings); see also BLUM, supra note 40, at 56 (explaining that
José Padilla was initially held as a material witness even though during the relevant
litigation, the Bush administration admitted that its primary reason for detaining
him as a material witness was to find out any and all information he possessed);
Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200 (highlighting the government’s highly visible use
of the federal material witness statute to hold suspected terrorists, including several
high profile 9/11 detainees).
56. Klein & Wittes, supra note 13, at 139.
57. Id. at 139–40 (citing HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 14).
58. Id. at 139.
59. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200–02 (commenting that the
government’s policy of holding witness detainees and not using their testimony
confirmed that the government was pretextually holding these individuals so that it
could eventually investigate them for suspected ties to terrorism).
60. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Fourth Circuits handled the majority of post-9/11 cases).
61. See, e.g., Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287, 302–03
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding the U.S. Attorney’s representation of materiality sufficient
to detain the witness in a grand jury proceeding); United States v. Finkielstain, No.
89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (assessing the materiality
of the detained witness as well as the appropriateness of taking a deposition in lieu of
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federal district courts held subsequent hearings to weigh the
sufficiency of evidence supporting material witness warrants to
62
determine whether continued detention was appropriate.
In subsequent appellate proceedings, most notably in United States
63
64
v. Awadallah and Higazy v. Templeton, the Second Circuit
demonstrated an increased willingness to defer to the government’s
position and allow the detention— or continued detention —of
material witnesses when national security interests were at stake, even
while recognizing that the court might not bestow such deference in
65
other cases. In Awadallah, the U.S. government detained Osama
Awadallah on a material witness warrant granted by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The warrant was based
on FBI Special Agent Ryan Plunkett’s supporting affidavit, which
revealed that the FBI had found Awadallah’s phone number in the
66
car of al-Hazmi, a 9/11 hijacker who Awadallah admitted he knew.
The FBI also discovered a box-cutter and photos of Osama bin-Laden
67
in Awadallah’s car. The FBI claimed that it might be difficult to
secure Awadallah’s grand jury testimony because Awadallah had
68
extensive family ties in Jordan and might be a flight risk.
detaining him); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628–29 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(determining whether the witness was material to the proceeding and impracticable
to secure other than through arrest); see also United States v. Basciano, 763 F. Supp.
2d 303, 335–36 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying defendant’s motion for material witness
warrants due to lack of evidence of materiality and impracticability); United States v.
Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing when it is appropriate to
take a deposition rather than detain the witness).
62. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding two hearings to
determine the appropriateness of continued detention); In re Application of the U.S.
for a Material Witness Warrant, Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144, for Material Witness
No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Material Witness No. 38]
(describing the hearing that assessed the sufficiency of material witness warrant and
granting continued detention).
63. 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
64. 505 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2007).
65. Cf. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 165 (discussing how the district court had prolonged
Higazy’s detention despite the government’s weak evidentiary showing). One legal
commentary suggests that the Second Circuit and lower district courts “allowed great
deference to the government’s claims that the material witnesses posed a threat to
national security,” thus justifying their continued detention. Parker, supra note 54,
at 28–32. Parker maintains that the Awadallah II court held that the defendant had
been properly detained under the federal material witness statute only because the
court found the material witness warrant valid, which required acknowledging that
the government had adequately met its burden as to materiality and impracticability.
Id. at 31–32. Therefore, Parker observed that the Second Circuit’s holding seemed
to implicitly defer to government interests in this factual context. Id.
66. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47.
67. United States v. Awadallah (Awadallah I), 202 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96–97, nn.24
& 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 349 F.3d 42.
68. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47; see also Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 95
(deferring to Agent Plunkett’s assertion that these facts would make it difficult to

CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

348

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/14/2013 12:48 PM

[Vol. 62:333

After assessing the government’s evidence, the district court
granted the material witness warrant, although testimony at a later
hearing revealed that the affidavit included misrepresentations and
69
omissions. Subsequently, the Second Circuit reviewed Awadallah’s
claim regarding both the validity of his material witness warrant and
his prolonged detention and found that it was proper to continue
holding him—even after excising the affidavit of misrepresentations
70
and omissions—because Awadallah did pose a flight risk. The court
found that his connection to one or more of the hijackers and
possible incentive to avoid appearing before the grand jury overrode
71
any assurance that Awadallah would appear as directed.
Meanwhile, in Higazy, the Second Circuit reviewed constitutional
and qualified immunity claims raised by Egyptian national Abdallah
72
Higazy concerning his detention as a material witness. In Higazy’s
prior federal district court case, the district court delved into the
validity of Higazy’s underlying material witness warrant and the
reasons why the government had misled the court by detaining
Higazy for multiple ten-day intervals despite not calling him as a
73
witness in a grand jury proceeding. The district court originally
authorized Higazy’s detention, even though it found the
government’s showing to be less than substantial, because the totality
of the findings demonstrated a significant risk that Higazy would fail
74
to voluntarily appear before the grand jury. The combined factors
influencing the district court’s decision included the radio
transceiver found in Higazy’s hotel room across the street from the
World Trade Center, and the fact that, although Higazy denied
ownership of the transceiver, he later admitted to being familiar with
75
the device because of his service in the Egyptian Air Corps.
secure Awadallah’s presence in front of the grand jury without a material witness
warrant).
69. See Awadallah I, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (recounting the facts that were omitted
from the affidavit: Awadallah had last seen Al-Hazmi over a year earlier; Awadallah
had moved from an address associated with the phone number eighteen months
earlier; he had used the box-cutter recently to install a new carpet in his apartment;
he had been cooperative with FBI agents in San Diego; and most significantly,
Awadallah had three brothers who lived in San Diego, one of whom was an American
citizen).
70. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 69–70.
71. Id.
72. Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 168, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2007).
73. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(inquiring into the government’s possible misrepresentation based on locating the
owner of the alleged evidence and discovering false testimony on the part of two
witnesses).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 358.
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Ten days later, the district court granted the government’s request
to continue detaining Higazy even though he had not yet been
76
Instead, the government formally
presented to the grand jury.
charged him with making false statements to the government by
77
Evidence later
initially denying possession of the transceiver.
revealed that the radio transceiver actually belonged to an American
pilot; this evidence prompted the district court to hold a hearing
inquiring into the parties’ representations to the district court
78
regarding Higazy’s confession.
After the government misled the
district court twice, the district court found that the government was
guilty of misconduct and ordered an internal investigation that would
79
publicize the results with the goal of deterring future misconduct.
C. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd: Closing the Door on Subjective Intent or Leaving
the Door Ajar?
Even though the Higazy hearings promised to start a trend toward
deterring future misconduct, the Supreme Court’s decision in al-Kidd
seemed to reverse this course, at least in regard to a material witness’s
80
ability to challenge the government’s motive.
In al-Kidd, the
government detained al-Kidd while en route to Saudi Arabia claiming
that al-Kidd had material information about an accused terrorist that
81
could only be obtained by detaining al-Kidd as a material witness.
Al-Kidd alleged in his petition that after 9/11, Attorney General John
Ashcroft implemented a policy that authorized federal officials to
pretextually detain terrorism suspects under the federal material
82
witness statutes. The Supreme Court held that although al-Kidd’s
arrest was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, there was
nevertheless sufficient individualized suspicion supporting the

76. Id. at 359.
77. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
78. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 359–61.
79. Higazy, 505 F.3d at 167; see also Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 363
(“The victim we are here concerned with is not the witness, but the Court, which was
materially misled. A wrong that so directly impacts the judicial process should not be
wholly beyond the Court’s power to address.”).
80. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (finding al-Kidd’s arrest
valid because it was objectively justified, regardless of the government’s subjective
intent).
81. Id. at 2079.
82. Id. Al-Kidd, a U.S. citizen with plane tickets to Saudi Arabia, argued that
federal officials originally secured the material witness warrant for him by claiming
that he possessed information “crucial” to a suspected terrorist’s prosecution, which
would be lost if al-Kidd boarded his flight. Id. He challenged the constitutionality of
Attorney General Ashcroft’s alleged policy on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id.
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material witness arrest warrant to meet the Fourth Amendment
83
“reasonableness” test.
Even though the Court seemingly barred a material witness’s ability
to argue that the government’s subjective intent led it to improperly
detain a witness under the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not
address the separate question of whether subjective intent could
come into play in assessing the validity of a material witness warrant
84
under the federal material witness statute. The Court effectively
foreclosed any detainee held under the material witness statute from
arguing that an officer’s improper motive in detaining him violated
his Fourth Amendment right because as long as the officer provides
an objectively valid reason for detaining a material witness, subjective
85
intent becomes irrelevant. The Court did not, however, rule on the
question of whether there was a violation of the material witness
statute in this case; in this way, the Court failed to address the fact
that al-Kidd could have been subpoenaed, that his testimony could
have been secured by deposition, and that the underlying material
86
witness warrant may have been insufficient.
Justice Ginsburg suggested in her concurrence that subjective
87
intent might nonetheless be considered in appropriate future cases.
Justice Ginsburg found that the Court’s individualized suspicion
standard —the purported objective and valid basis upholding the
material witness warrant—suffered from a critical flaw, namely that
individualized suspicion connoted wrongdoing on the part of the

83. See id. at 2080–83 (explaining that “reasonableness” is an objective inquiry,
meaning that if the circumstances viewed objectively justify the challenged action,
then the action is reasonable regardless of the subjective intent, and finding that
because individualized suspicion supported al-Kidd’s material witness warrant, the
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
84. See id. at 2083 n.3 (explaining how the Court did not have to rule on a
statutory argument because in the Court’s view, al-Kidd had conceded the validity of
the material witness warrant, thus basing its decision on Fourth Amendment
grounds).
85. See id. at 2082–84 (rejecting “a district judge’s ipse dixit of a holding” as
authority for the proposition that suspects could not be pretextually detained as
material witnesses).
86. See id. at 2083 (passing on the sufficiency of the material witness warrant
because al-Kidd conceded that the warrant was based on individualized suspicion).
87. See id. at 2087–88, 2089 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(finding the material witness warrant invalid because the warrant contained
omissions and misrepresentations, and concluding that Attorney General Ashcroft
intended to detain material witnesses “as a means to ‘tak[e] suspected terrorists off the
street’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). In her concurrence, Justice
Sotomayor also endorsed a subjective intent analysis, suggesting that it might be
considered in a future case involving the prolonged detention of an individual held
without probable cause where the government believed he committed a criminal
offense. Id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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witness rather than necessity for testimony.
Moreover, Justice
Ginsburg found al-Kidd’s material witness warrant invalid because the
government’s findings both as to materiality and impracticability
were inadequate, which prompted her to invite courts to engage in
more thorough scrutiny of the government’s showings in any material
89
witness warrant.
D. Strict Scrutiny in Equal Protection Cases: How Heightened Scrutiny
Helps To Identify Improper Motive
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in al-Kidd suggests that district
courts reviewing material witness warrant applications or the validity
of authorized warrants should exercise vigilance, remembering that
90
the decision to grant arrest is discretionary. Such vigilant exercise
by district courts can draw useful parallels from the equal protection
context, where a level of heightened scrutiny is employed to screen
for improper motive on the part of the government. When the
government enacts a practice or statute that is deemed “suspect,” like
a race-based measure, a reviewing court will assess the practice under
strict scrutiny, which requires the court to uphold the practice or
statute only if it furthers a compelling governmental interest and uses
91
narrowly tailored means to achieve that end. For example, in City of
92
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court explained that where
race-based measures are used to address prior discrimination, courts
apply strict scrutiny because “[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry”
into the reasons for employing race-based measures, a court cannot
properly assess whether these classifications are “‘benign’ or
‘remedial’” and whether they are “in fact motivated by illegitimate
93
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” The Court indicated
that the function of strict scrutiny in equal protection cases is to
‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this
compelling goal so closely [e.g., narrow tailoring] that there is little

88. Id. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. Id.
90. See id. (reminding courts that only through “vigilant exercise” of the duty to
scrutinize a material witness warrant application will the court protect the material
witness from unnecessary or improper detention).
91. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517–18 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
92. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
93. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).

CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

352

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/14/2013 12:48 PM

[Vol. 62:333

or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
94
prejudice or stereotype.

In Croson, the City of Richmond argued that it needed to
implement a minority “set-aside” program, which required prime
contractors to allot a fixed percentage of the contract’s total dollar
amount to minority business enterprise subcontractors in order to
95
remedy past discrimination. The Court, however, found that the
program failed to pass muster under strict scrutiny because the city
96
did not prove a compelling interest that would justify the program.
Specifically, the Court found the city’s factual predicate insufficient
because it was based on a general finding that showed a history of
97
discrimination across the entire construction industry. The Court
felt that this type of broad assertion provided the legislature with no
guidance to determine the scope of the injury that was to be
98
remedied.
Additionally, the Court held that the plan was not
narrowly tailored because it was not linked to documented
discrimination in any meaningful way, and because it failed to
consider race-neutral means, such as the simplification of bidding
procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and
financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races, for
increasing minority-owned business participation in the construction
99
industry.
Thus the Court’s vigilant exercise of judicial review
ultimately allowed it to identify the city’s actual motive, which the
Court identified as likely having been achieving “outright racial
100
balancing,” for enacting race-based measures.

94. Id. (emphases added).
95. See id. at 477–80 (majority opinion) (explaining the city’s argument that
prior discrimination was responsible for the small number of minority-owned
businesses in the local construction industry).
96. Id. at 498–500.
97. Id. at 498–99 (indicating that the city’s argument that the entire Richmond
construction industry had practiced discrimination failed to precisely define the
wrong in a way that would allow for any meaningful relief for minority business
enterprises).
98. Id.; see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (providing that broad generalizations do not serve as adequate
justifications for race-based relief because they have “no logical stopping point”).
99. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
100. Id.; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text.

CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

TEXT AND PRETEXT

1/14/2013 12:48 PM

353

E. Clear and Convincing Evidence in Civil Cases: How a Requirement of
Heightened Evidentiary Showings Better Protects Individual Liberty Interest
1.

Setting the clear and convincing standard
Similar to the safeguards afforded by strict scrutiny, the civil
detention context also provides a useful model for material witness
detention courts to follow when reviewing applications for material
witness warrants. Civil detention cases illustrate that requiring a clear
and convincing standard from the government before authorizing civil
detention provides significant protection of individual liberty
101
interest.
For example, Justice Harlan explained that the standard of proof
in civil detention cases is intended to “‘instruct the factfinder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
102
The standard serves two functions: (1) to allocate
adjudication.’”
the risk of error between the parties; and (2) to indicate the level of
103
relative significance the ultimate decision carries.
Along this
spectrum of risk, civil cases between private parties that involve only
monetary damages are at the low end because society is minimally
concerned with the fairness of the outcome. For this reason, a mere
104
preponderance of the evidence is the requisite burden of proof,
the result of which is that the litigants equally share the risk of
105
error. At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the interests of the
criminal defendant that are protected by the constitutional
requirement that defendants only be found guilty when the state has
proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, which limits as much as
106
possible the likelihood of any error in judgments.
The
101. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79–80 (1992) (recognizing an
individual’s liberty interest under the Due Process Clause by requiring that the state
provide clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness before
authorizing the individual’s commitment to a mental institution); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (applying the clear and convincing standard to protect
the interests of the mentally ill).
102. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (asserting that a preponderance of the evidence standard requires only
that the party bearing the burden convince the factfinder by a fifty-one percent
likelihood of each element and thus creates an equal risk of error in the outcome by
both the party bearing the burden of proof and the factfinder).
106. See id. at 423–24 (discussing why, given the weighty interests of the
defendant, society finds it appropriate to impose the highest burden of proof upon
the government rather than risk possible error by having the defendant shoulder the
burden of proof).
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intermediate standard, generally known as clear and convincing
evidence, protects important individual interests in a number of civil
107
cases, including deportation and denaturalization cases.
In Addington v. Texas, Frank O’Neal Addington challenged a Texas
court’s decision that found him mentally ill and committed him to a
mental institution to protect him from himself and to protect others
from any danger that he might otherwise pose; the Texas court
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, whereas
Addington argued that the court should have used a beyond a
108
reasonable doubt standard.
To decide what standard should
govern in an involuntary commitment case, the Supreme Court
balanced Addington’s individual interest in freedom from indefinite
and involuntary confinement against the state’s interest in
committing to mental institutions individuals who are emotionally
109
disturbed and might pose a danger to themselves and others. The
Court noted that of equal importance in the assessment is the
function of the legal process, the goal of which is to minimize the risk
110
of erroneous decisions.
Thus, in Addington, the Court held that
Addington’s interest in liberty outweighed the state’s interest in
protecting the public from the any potential threat he might pose,
such that due process required a showing of clear and convincing
evidence to justify his involuntary commitment, though proof beyond
111
a reasonable doubt was not constitutionally compelled.
107. Id. at 424; see also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (assigning clear
and convincing evidence as the appropriate standard of proof in deportation cases);
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (finding the clear and convincing
standard necessary in deportation cases); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118, 125, 159 (1943) (declaring that denaturalization cases merit clear and
convincing evidence).
108. Addington, 441 U.S. at 421–22.
109. Id. at 425; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992)
(reaffirming Addington and finding that to involuntarily commit an individual to a
mental institution, the state is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and that he poses a danger
to himself and others); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to
Standard of Proof Required in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 97 A.L.R. 3D 785, 785 (1980)
[hereinafter Landis, Modern Status](stating that clear and convincing evidence is the
appropriate standard of proof where the state involuntarily commits mentally ill and
dangerous individuals to mental institutions or individuals found unfit to stand
trials).
110. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (suggesting that courts can help minimize
improper outcomes by factfinders that might harm individual liberty interest by
imposing higher burdens of proof at initial commitment proceedings); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (discussing that the possible margin of error in
a freedom of speech case requires that the government bear the burden of proving
that appellants engaged in criminal speech).
111. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 430–31. But see Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76
(distinguishing criminal cases in which a defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity, and holding that in such instances, the government need not meet the
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As Addington illustrates, in civil detention cases, the government
bears the burden of proving under a certain evidentiary standard that
there is a sufficient state interest in indefinitely committing an
112
individual. Despite having recognized the importance of individual
liberty interest, the Supreme Court has, at times, reversed the burden
of proof when certain factors weigh in favor of the state’s interests
over the individual’s interests. In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
113
Health, for example, an Ohio statute criminalized performing an
abortion on an unmarried and unemancipated minor except in four
scenarios, two of which depended on a judicial procedure that might
114
allow a minor to bypass the notice and consent provisions.
To
utilize the judicial bypass option, the minor had to prove— by clear
and convincing evidence —an allegation of maturity, a pattern of
abuse, or an explanation as to why notice was not in her best
115
interests.
The minor, Rachel Roe, raised a facial challenge to the
statute’s constitutionality, arguing that a bypass procedure should not
require a minor to prove maturity or best interests by clear and
convincing evidence because when a state is seeking to infringe on an
individual’s liberty interest, it is the state that should be saddled with
116
the risk of error. The Court rejected Roe’s argument and held that
the state was entitled to impose a heightened evidentiary burden
because the minor, assisted by an attorney and guardian ad litem,
117
would testify unopposed.
These cases illustrate how the clear and convincing standard serves
as a safeguard for important individual and state interests by
requiring that the party bearing the burden of proof offer a high
enough quantum of evidence before a court can authorize civil
detention or alternatively allow the individual’s interest to go
unopposed where the individual is already protected through certain
mechanisms. Applied to material witnesses, clear and convincing
evidence could similarly require more from the government before
allowing for any deprivation of liberty.

standard of clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily commit the individual);
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363–66 (1983) (relieving the state of its
evidentiary standard when it involuntarily commits criminal defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity).
112. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
113. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
114. Id. at 507–08.
115. Id. at 508.
116. Id. at 509, 515.
117. Id. at 516.
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2.

The clear and convincing standard upon review
Courts are concerned with the appropriate burden of proof not
only during initial determinations regarding involuntary
commitment, but also during periodic review proceedings of an
individual’s detention. The state carries the burden of continuing to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the individual both
presently poses a danger to society and suffers from a mental
118
illness.
Consequently, in some civil detention cases, courts are
additionally required to periodically review the government’s reasons
119
The Supreme
justifying continued commitment of the individual.
Court has indicated that regardless of the reason for confinement to
a mental institution, the individual can only be held so long as he
continues to be mentally ill and dangerous; the individual cannot be
120
held any longer than this.
Involuntary commitment is therefore
not constitutionally permissible after the justification for the initial
121
commitment ceases to exist. Moreover, the individual is entitled to
periodic review of his condition in order to prevent or cure any risk
of error in the initial determination that committed the individual to
122
the mental institution in the first place.
State courts have indicated that many statutes calling for the
confinement of sexual offenders and sexual psychopaths require
periodic status hearings because these hearings provide the offender
123
with additional procedural safeguards.
Giving courts additional
118. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77–78 (1992); see In re Det. of Turay, 986
P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (stating that in annual show cause hearings for
committed sexual violent predators, the state bears the burden of proving that the
individual is currently suffering from a mental defect that makes him likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence).
119. See, e.g., Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at 785 (discussing that Texas
courts are required to periodically review a mental patient’s condition when the state
has involuntarily committed the patient).
120. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77; see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 370
(1983) (providing that the committed individual can only be confined until “he has
regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society”); O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that involuntary commitment is
appropriate only when the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous).
121. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
122. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979) (stating that mentally ill
patients are provided continuous opportunities to have their confinement reviewed
thus ensuring that any risk of erroneous confinement is minimized).
123. See, e.g., In re Arnold, 292 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that
periodic review reduces the risk of error); In re Turay, 986 P.2d at 806–07 (providing
that the state statute mandates that sexually violent predators receive an annual
review hearing); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Standard of Proof Required Under
Statute Providing for Commitment of Sexual Offenders or Sexual Psychopaths, 96 A.L.R. 840,
845 (1979) [hereinafter Landis, Standard of Proof]. Unlike sexually violent predators
(SVP), mentally ill individuals committed under other statutes receive review every
180 days rather than annually because the course of treatment for the mentally ill
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opportunities to review whether to extend an individual’s involuntary
commitment ensures that the state can continue to show that the
sexual offender poses an ongoing danger to others due to a mental
124
abnormality or mental disorder. However, once the individual has
been treated adequately and cleared by personnel at the relevant
facility, such that he no longer poses a danger to himself or others,
the original reason for holding him is no longer valid and the court is
125
required to release the individual.
The material witness statute serves as a mechanism for ensuring
that the testimony of witnesses, who possess material information
related to criminal proceedings and who pose a flight risk, is secured
126
by authorizing detention of these witnesses.
However, the
government’s burden in showing that a material witness is both
material and impracticable is not a clearly established burden, as
127
illustrated by the varying federal case law.
What is clear is that a
material witness can only effectively ask whether the government was
improperly motivated when seeking a material witness’s arrest
through the federal material witness statute because the Supreme
Court has foreclosed any discussion of subjective intent under the
128
Fourth Amendment after al-Kidd.
However, a material witness still has the ability to raise subjective
intent and argue pretextual detention by arguing that the
government has not met its burden under the federal material
witness statute. Because no clear burden attaches to these showings,
differs significantly from that of SVPs, and because SVPs pose a higher public safety
threat given that they have committed at least one sexually violent act. In re Turay,
986 P.2d at 807.
124. See, e.g., In re Turay, 986 P.2d at 813–14 (holding that the state must continue
to prove at an annual show cause hearing that the sexual offender is suffering from a
mental disorder that would make him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if
released into the community or discharged from treatment).
125. See Landis, Standard of Proof, supra note 123, at 842 (indicating that sexual
offenders or sexual psychopaths can only be committed so long as they remain a
danger to others because the relevant statutes are intended to both protect society
from ongoing danger and to treat the individual).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (“If it appears . . . that the testimony of a person
is material in a criminal proceeding, and it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer
may order the arrest of the person . . . .”).
127. Compare United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding that the impracticability prong was met where several subpoena attempts
were unsuccessful), with Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 944 (9th Cir. 1971)
(determining that the impracticable prong was not satisfied even though the witness
had access to a large sum of cash, contact with the fugitive, and was captured on the
rooftop of a building).
128. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011) (holding that
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment is determined by an objective test and
that the subjective intent motivating officials is irrelevant).
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though, the civil detention context illustrates how in arguing
subjective intent, material witnesses would greatly benefit from
requiring the government to show by clear and convincing evidence
that these witnesses are material and impracticable at the time the
government requests a material witness warrant because a higher
initial burden of proof helps protect individual liberty interest. And
assuming these warrants are granted, material witnesses would
equally gain from having courts review their material witness warrants
under a higher standard of review because, as strict scrutiny illustrates
in the equal protection standard, the higher the standard of judicial
review, the greater the court’s ability to identify improper motive on
the government’s part.
II. UNDER THE FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTE, COURTS
SHOULD CONDITION GRANTING AND REVIEWING MATERIAL WITNESS
WARRANTS ON CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO PROTECT THE
WITNESS’S LIBERTY INTEREST, SCREEN FOR IMPROPER MOTIVE, AND
OBTAIN ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROLONGED DETENTION
Courts should implement the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard employed in civil detention cases in the material witness
context because it will allow courts to require concrete showings of
materiality and impracticability when the government applies for a
material witness warrant, which is necessary because of the particular
129
If a court grants the material witness
liberty interest at stake.
warrant, then at the material witness’s first hearing, the court should
proceed to review the underlying warrant under a heightened
standard of review, much like courts do in the equal protection
context when they use strict scrutiny, so that the court may
thoroughly assess whether the witness has in fact been held for
testimony in a future criminal proceeding or instead, for individual

129. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(proposing a bill to replace the material witness statute that would require that the
government show probable cause that the witness has been served with a subpoena
and failed or refused to appear as required, or else prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the service of a subpoena is likely to result in flight risk, in order for a
court to grant a material witness warrant). Senator Leahy’s bill would accomplish
what this Comment proposes—convincing or dissuading the court for a second time
that the government has fully met its evidentiary burden, and identifying instances of
pretextual detention—by only authorizing detention where there is clear and
convincing evidence that the witness may flee or fail to appear in court and by
prolonging that detention only if continued clear and convincing proof is shown that
“such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the witness as required.”
See S. 1739, 109th Cong. § 1(a)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(A) (2005) (2005) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence for initial and continued detention).
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130

investigation in contravention of the statute’s purpose. Lastly, even
if the warrant passes muster under this stricter standard of review,
courts can nonetheless hold periodic hearings to demand that the
government show why the witness continues to pose a flight risk and
present what diligent efforts it is taking to hold the witness under the
131
least restrictive means possible.
A. Requiring Clear and Convincing Showings of Materiality and
Impracticability in Applications for Material Witness Warrants Protects the
Material Witness’s Significant Liberty Interest in Otherwise One-Sided
Proceedings
A court can appropriately require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence, following the standards of proof in civil
detention cases, before granting a material witness warrant because
132
the determination is made at a non-adversarial ex parte proceeding.
At a material witness warrant proceeding, only the government
presents its position, and no other party has the opportunity to voice
133
opposition on the material witness’s behalf. For example, in Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, the Supreme Court approved a state’s
requirement that a minor prove maturity or best interests by clear
and convincing evidence before allowing a bypass procedure to
parental notice of an abortion, particularly because judicial bypass
procedures occurred at ex parte proceedings where the minor’s
134
testimony went unopposed.
Similarly, applications for material

130. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (explaining why heightened scrutiny helps to uncover the root of the
government’s motive in taking a certain action).
131. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,944 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(recommending that courts conduct periodic reviews to ensure that material
witnesses continue to pose a flight risk meriting extended detention).
132. Cf. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990)
(upholding the clear and convincing evidentiary standard that a minor must meet to
obtain judicial bypass of the parental notification requirement under the Ohio
abortion statute). Non-adversarial ex parte proceeding refers to a court hearing
where only one party is represented, thus eliminating the proceeding’s otherwise
adversarial nature. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2012). For that
reason, ex parte communications are often banned under statute and enforced by
courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2006) (banning ex parte communications by any
interested person outside of the relevant administrative agency on the merits of the
issue).
133. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 197, 201 (describing that material witnesses
can be subjected to arrest and detention solely on the basis of the government’s
statement).
134. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (accepting the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard and further noting that the Court’s precedent does
not require a lower standard, and that the minor was aided by both an attorney and a
guardian ad litem).
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witness warrants merit a clear and convincing standard of proof
because courts determine whether to grant material witness warrants
at ex parte hearings where the government alone presents its case
and the material witness is not afforded representation or the
135
corresponding ability to question the government’s showings.
However, unlike judicial bypass procedure cases where the Court
has found the state’s interest to override a minor’s individual liberty
interest, the situation for material witnesses is reversed because the
136
testimony of the government goes unopposed.
Regardless of
whether it is the government or the material witness that is not
represented, the underlying concern remains the same: The party
not represented is not there to present a position, which may include
controverting and presenting evidence against what is being argued
137
before the court at a one-sided proceeding. Therefore, a court can
appropriately require the unopposed party to shoulder a heavier
burden of proof to balance the otherwise lopsided nature of the
138
proceeding.
Not only does the clear and convincing standard afford protection
to the unrepresented party, like a material witness, but it also helps
inform a court’s full and fair assessment of whether a material witness
is both material to a criminal proceeding and impracticable to secure
through a subpoena as required under the federal material witness

135. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (basing the material
witness warrant solely on the affidavit of the investigating FBI agent); In re Francisco
M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (granting the government’s ex parte
motion to detain Francisco as a material witness based only on the detective’s
declaration).
136. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (explaining that an attorney
and a guardian ad litem accompany the minor at the judicial bypass hearing);
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes
Requiring Parental Notification of or Consent to Minor’s Abortion, 77 A.L.R. 5TH 1, 152–53
(2000) (reasoning that the Court in Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health allowed the minor to
carry the burden of proof through clear and convincing evidence because she alone
would present testimony at the judicial bypass hearing and she would be represented
by an attorney and a guardian ad litem). But see Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47
(describing that the government’s interests alone were represented by the Assistant
United States Attorney at the ex parte material witness warrant proceeding).
137. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (suggesting that the state was
the disadvantaged party because “the bypass procedure contemplates an ex parte
proceeding at which no one opposes the minor’s testimony”); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d
at 47 (leaving open whether Awadallah’s absence may have harmed his ability to
challenge the findings presented by Agent Plunkett and the Assistant United States
Attorney before the district court as to why Awadallah could be properly detained).
138. See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 516 (rejecting a challenge to the
heightened standard of proof imposed on a minor seeking a judicial bypass
procedure where she was represented by an attorney and a guardian ad litem and
the state was not represented at all).
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139

statute.
The heightened standard provides a fuller factual picture
for the court because it requires the government to show more than
conclusory assertions as to both the materiality prong and the
140
impracticability prong.
Under the current standard, a presiding
judge issues a material witness warrant based on the government’s
application, which is supported by affidavits crafted by U.S. attorneys
141
or other government agents.
Consequently, courts tend to credit
the government’s position in the material witness warrant application
142
for lack of a differing view.
In addition to the one-sided nature of the relevant proceeding, the
interest at stake for the material witness is critical in determining the
143
standard of proof that should govern.
In Addington, the Court
recognized that the liberty interest of individuals committed to
mental institutions require the state to provide clear and convincing
144
evidence before an involuntary commitment may be authorized.
Similar to the interests of involuntarily committed individuals,
material witnesses have an important liberty interest at stake in
139. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(recommending that material witness warrants be issued if the court is convinced by
the government’s clear and convincing showing that the witness is likely to flee or
cannot be adequately secured through means other than arrest).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006) (failing to require a particular standard of proof
as to materiality and impracticability showings). But see 151 CONG. REC. 20,944
(2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (proposing that material witnesses only be
held for additional periods when the government can demonstrate through clear
and convincing evidence that the witness poses a flight risk, and suggesting that the
court take into account the witness’s history and characteristics in determining
whether to release or continue detaining the witness).
141. See, e.g., Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47 (granting a material witness warrant
based on an FBI agent’s affidavit even though the witness had been arrested three
hours earlier); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (issuing
a material witness warrant based on declarations made by investigating officer
Detective Arroyo, who filed the material witness warrant application before the
court).
142. See supra notes 65–76 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (cautioning that Foucha
had a significant liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint, which would by
definition be denied by virtue of being involuntarily committed); Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 515–16 (concluding that a clear and convincing standard
was appropriate); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 427 (1979) (noting that
civil commitment for any purpose substantially deprives the individual of a liberty
interest, meriting due process protection and overriding the state’s interest); see also
Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at 785–86 (discussing that both the mentally ill
and those found unfit to stand trial hold important liberty interests in the outcome
of their civil commitment proceedings); Landis, Modern Status, supra note 109, at
785–86 (stating that some courts acknowledge that sex offenders who are convicted
of a sex offense that may be punished by any period of imprisonment have a critical
liberty interest at stake to justify a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt).
144. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 433 (holding that the trial court’s instruction
based on a clear and convincing evidence standard did not violate Addington’s due
process rights).

CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

362

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/14/2013 12:48 PM

[Vol. 62:333

material witness warrant proceedings because the court’s
145
determination can result in the witness’s arrest and incarceration.
Compare for example, Addington and Osama Awadallah—the
student detained following the 9/11 attacks. Both Addington and
146
Awadallah had an interest in not being deprived of their liberty.
Further, both men had an interest in being free of the collateral
impacts of detention, which could endure long after release. For
Awadallah, detention jeopardized his college education, putting his
future ability to achieve a certain level of success and prosperity at
risk, while for Addington, detention forced him to carry the stigma
147
associated with having been involuntarily committed.
For these
reasons, a court determining whether to issue a material witness
warrant should consider and protect the witness’s liberty interest by
only authorizing a witness’s arrest where the government meets the
148
clear and convincing standard.
Courts generally acknowledge that materiality is a low bar to meet
and will be satisfied so long as the government shows that the
witness’s testimony is central to the proceeding and not merely
149
duplicative of other witness testimony or impeachment evidence.
145. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 200 (reporting that the government has
detained dozens of individuals since 9/11 and many were subjected to harsh
treatment).
146. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–27 (describing that Addington possessed an
individual interest in not being involuntarily confined for an indefinite period and
an individual interest in avoiding an erroneous and inappropriate commitment);
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 45–46 (revisiting Awadallah’s story as a college student in
San Diego who was concerned about missing class when he discovered he would be
subject to interrogation by FBI agents).
147. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26 (recognizing the importance of protecting
against the unavoidable labeling that accompanies one who is involuntarily
committed to a mental institution); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 45–46 (noting that
Awadallah missed class as a result of his interrogation); see also Ray Rivera & Matthew
Sweeney, Acquaintance of 2 Hijackers is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2006),
www.nytimes.com/2006/11/18/nyregion/18immigrant.html (discussing the fact that
Awadallah was a college student prior to his detention and that he subsequently
obtained a college degree).
148. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 722 (2009) (highlighting that material witnesses have a
substantial “constitutional interest in minimizing nonpunitive restrictions on
individual liberty” that merits careful consideration before granting detention).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (determining that testimony from an accountant who
created shell corporations allegedly used by the defendants to commit fraud
qualified as material); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (finding that the government had established probable cause that Feingold’s
testimony was material because Feingold had appeared as a witness before the grand
jury that indicted the defendant for income tax evasion, and Feingold had signed
checks totaling $50,000 payable to the XYZ Collection Company, of which defendant
was the sole proprietor); see also Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144, Governing Arrest and Detention of
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Because the government can satisfy materiality by showing that it is
reasonably probable that the witness’s testimony is material to a
criminal proceeding, the government’s burden of proof operates like
150
a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Courts tend to apply
this lower standard by crediting the government’s assertions about
how material the witness may be —particularly in grand jury cases—
when these representations are made by detectives, FBI agents,
151
federal prosecutors, and other government officials. The tendency
of courts to defer to the government often leads to findings of
152
materiality based on minimal proof. Consequently, the heightened
standard of clear and convincing evidence is necessary to safeguard
against instances where materiality might not be satisfied. For
example, the threshold may not be met where a witness’s supposed
materiality is either cumulative of other testimony or insufficiently
Material Witnesses to Federal Crimes, 2 A.L.R. FED. 2D 425, 442 (2005) (illustrating
how the witness’s participation in grand jury proceedings and personal
involvement in certain transactions rendered his testimony material (citing
Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 627)).
150. See Morrell v. Finke, 184 S.W.3d 257, 272 (Tex. App. 2005) (explaining that
a preponderance of the evidence is the equivalent of a reasonable medical
probability for purposes of medical malpractice); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. e (2010) (citing Morrell, 184
S.W.3d at 271–72).
151. See, e.g., In re de Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1983) (determining
that the government proved materiality when it claimed that the witness’s testimony
was material to a grand jury indictment); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231
(7th Cir. 1982) (finding that materiality in grand jury proceedings was satisfied based
only on a representation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office that the detainee’s
testimony was material); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971)
(establishing materiality of the testimony was satisfied by the “mere statement” of a
responsible government official claiming the testimony was material); Feingold, 416 F.
Supp. at 628 (crediting the assertions of Special Agent Merino asserting that
Feingold could give testimony that was material); In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d
794, 799 (Ct. App. 2001) (accepting Detective Arroyo’s declarations that Francisco,
the material witness, had been present in the murder victim’s car thus making him
material to criminal proceedings regarding the murder). A government official’s
representation as to materiality is sufficient in the grand jury context because it
“strikes a proper and adequate balance between protecting the secrecy of the grand
jury’s investigation and subjecting an individual to an unjustified arrest.” Oliver, 683
F.2d at 231; see also Rosenhouse, supra note 149, at 441–44 (discussing the previously
cited cases as examples of when and how the materiality prong of the federal
material witness statute is satisfied).
152. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (illustrating that courts often
credit the government’s showings, particularly with respect to materiality
determinations). But see Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 59 (balancing the government’s
interest in investigating the conspirators who carried out the 9/11 attacks against
the witness’s liberty interest to determine reasonability of detention and
concluding that the federal material witness statute sufficiently minimizes any
intrusion on the material witness’s liberty while properly accounting for the
government’s “countervailing interests”). The court found that materiality is met
based on a totality of the circumstances, where the government’s evidence
supported the inference that the witness knew one of the 9/11 hijackers.
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70.
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particularized to demonstrate that the information possessed by the
153
witness is adequately relevant to the case.
On the other hand, the impracticability prong generally requires a
slightly higher burden of proof because the statute’s terms require
that witnesses be secured by subpoena in the first instance and
detained only where a subpoena has failed or will likely fail to secure
154
the witness’s presence.
Therefore, courts authorize detaining a
155
Even
material witness only when the witness poses a flight risk.
though the statute suggests that impracticability is a weightier
assessment, courts often grant material witness warrants where it is
more probable than not that the witness will flee rather than
requiring the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence
156
that the witness is likely to flee.

153. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that the affidavit used to secure al-Kidd’s
detention failed to provide an adequate basis for the material witness warrant as to
materiality because the government “did not state with particularity the information
al-Kidd purportedly possessed” that would make him material to the government’s
prosecution of defendant Sami Omar al-Hussayen); United States v. Basciano, 763 F.
Supp. 2d 303, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (declaring that even if the identities of two
material witnesses, CW-2 and CW-3, were known, there was not a proper showing that
their testimony would be material to the case because the testimony could just as
easily be “merely cumulative of CW-1’s” or another witness’s testimony or other
impeachment evidence).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006); see supra Part I.A.1 (explaining the showings
required to meet impracticability under the federal material witness statute).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
156. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that the government’s representation in the affidavit underlying the material
witness warrant failed the impracticability prong where the only representation made
was unelaborate and consisted of a statement that al-Kidd would travel to Saudi
Arabia and the U.S. government would be unable to secure his presence by
subpoena); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 77 (Straub, J., concurring in the judgment)
(determining that the government failed to meet the impracticability prong where
the redacted affidavit did not adequately show Awadallah was a flight risk). But see
Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 70 (majority opinion) (finding that impracticability is met
where Awadallah did not step forward to share information he had about one or
more of the hijackers, thus suggesting a risk of flight); In re de Jesus Berrios, 706 F.2d at
357 (holding that the material witness warrant was properly issued on the premise
that the appellant had avoided service of several subpoenas ordering him to give
testimony before the grand jury thus making it impracticable to secure his presence
by subpoena); United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 CR. 0009, 1989 WL 39685, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1989) (accepting that it would be impracticable to secure the
witness through subpoena because Lecueder was a Uruguayan citizen scheduled to
leave the United States well in advance of the defendant’s trial); Feingold, 416 F.
Supp. at 629 (granting the material witness warrant based on Marino’s affidavit
showing unsuccessful attempts to serve Feingold with a subpoena either through
Feingold’s attorney or on seven different days at his home).
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Material witnesses have an equal if not higher interest in being free
157
from undue constraint than their civilly detained counterparts.
First, material witnesses are detained because they can provide critical
information in criminal proceedings, not because they pose a danger
158
to others. Material witnesses constitute the unrepresented party at
159
the very hearing determining whether to grant their detention.
Consequently, material witnesses should be afforded the same level of
assurance that the court will only allow the government to detain
them on a clear and convincing showing of materiality and
160
impracticability.
B. Reviewing Material Witness Warrants Under a Higher Standard of
Review “Smokes Out” Pretextual Use of the Material Witness Statute and
Prevents Courts from Unjustifiably Deferring to Government Interests
Material witnesses have a significant liberty interest that justifies
both application of a higher evidentiary standard at the initial
determination hearing that precedes detention as well as to heightened
judicial scrutiny of their material witness warrants following
161
Unlike defendants, material witnesses are not held
detention.
162
because they are suspected of or have committed a crime; to the
157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining how the material
witness’s duty to disclose information is high enough to warrant infringing on the
witness’s liberty interest).
158. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (explaining that a material
witness can be detained because the witness possesses knowledge of a crime, not
because the witness is suspected of engaging in crime or because the witness may
pose a danger to the community).
159. See supra notes 132–33, 135–36 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
of the initial material witness warrant proceedings).
160. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text (providing the circumstances
under which clear and convincing evidence is warranted). But see supra note 156
(specifying instances where a clear and convincing standard would not be
appropriate if it would preclude finding impracticability where the government
made reasonable efforts to subpoena or genuinely showed flight risk). In cases
where a material witness has avoided service of a subpoena or is imminently
scheduled to leave the country with no clear prospect of returning, a higher
evidentiary burden might otherwise inhibit the government’s ability to hold witnesses
who are critical to the government’s case and unavailable for testimony through
other means. See supra note 156.
161. Part II.B focuses on entirely separate proceedings than those discussed in
Part II.A. Where Part II.A targeted proceedings where the court is determining
whether to issue a material witness warrant at all, e.g., authorize detention, Part II.B
hones in on hearings where the court is determining whether to continue
authorizing detention. Thus, Part II.B is directed at the validity of the material
witness warrant rather than the determination to issue the warrant.
162. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (taking issue with the majority’s emphasis on the
validity of the material witness warrant, which was based on individualized suspicion,
because it implied that al-Kidd had engaged in wrongdoing); see also Cole, supra note
148, at 722 (stating that the federal material witness statute allows detention not
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contrary, the material witness statute “does not ‘involv[e] suspicion,
163
or lack of suspicion,’ of the individual so identified.”
Consequently, a material witness’s interest in liberty is seriously at
risk, and failing to employ heightened judicial review at this separate
and subsequent stage of the process could allow the government to
continue holding witnesses for which the government lacks probable
164
cause to charge with a crime.
Therefore, in failing to apply a
heightened standard of judicial review, a court can specifically
contravene the federal material witness statute by allowing for
165
detention of a material witness on less than adequate grounds.
If, upon review, a court grants continued detention by effectively
rubberstamping the government’s previously authorized material
witness warrant, then the court may less easily distinguish cases where
the government seeks to detain a witness for individual investigation
166
rather than for testimony. Deferring to the government’s position a
second time, rather than requiring ongoing clear and convincing
evidence of materiality and impracticability when reviewing a
material witness warrant, presupposes that the government is
167
continuing to hold the witness for its stated reasons.
In practice,
because of alleged criminal activity on the part of the witness, but only for the
purpose of ensuring testimony in a criminal proceeding); Klein & Wittes, supra note
13, at 133 (arguing that the material witness statute qualifies as “the most purely
preventive detention authority” because its targets are unindicted, it does not specify
a maximum length of permissible detention, and the purpose of the statute is to
prevent the harm a fleeing witness inflicts rather than the threat the witness might
pose to public safety); Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 199 (highlighting that the
federal material witness statute is controversial specifically because it involves
imprisoning individuals who are not charged with a crime).
163. See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004)).
164. See Cole, supra note 148, at 722 (stressing that the federal material witness
statute is not intended to indefinitely allow detention of suspicious individuals under
criminal investigation, thus implying that courts should carefully consider their
decision to prevent this from occurring).
165. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(pointing out that the material witness law is founded on a narrow purpose, which is
solely to hold witnesses for testimony and not to hold witnesses as criminal suspects).
166. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing that the reviewing
judge, who had presided over the initial hearing authorizing Awadallah’s arrest,
granted Awadallah’s prolonged detention because it was “reasonable under the
circumstances”). By the time of the second hearing, the government had not only
arrested Awadallah before the court sanctioned the action but also left out key pieces
of information that would have minimized Awadallah’s flight risk and possibly
secured his release. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
167. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 47 (noting that the district court judge at the
October 2, 2001 hearing declined to release Awadallah following his transfer to
New York, finding his detention “reasonable under the circumstances” with no
indication that the judge reviewed the September 21, 2001 arrest warrant or the
September 25, 2001 order denying bail and ordering Awadallah’s transfer when
deciding to deny release).
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such sustained deference can operate like a rebuttable presumption
favoring detention, defeated only by evidence to the contrary
168
In certain factual contexts, like
presented by the material witness.
in the aftermath of a breach of national security, the government may
make overly generalized assertions that a witness continues to be
material to mask its actual intent to hold the individual until it can
169
gather sufficient evidence to charge the witness with a crime.
Consequently, failing to review a material witness warrant under a
clear and convincing standard may lead to increased pretextual
detention, whereas the government might otherwise be deterred to
prolong detention if it knew that a higher standard of review hung in
170
the balance.
Concerns regarding pretext do not only arise in the material
witness context. Extrapolating from the equal protection context,
where courts apply strict scrutiny when reviewing race-based remedial
measures that are by nature suspect, a court can similarly review a
material witness warrant under the clear and convincing standard.
This is because the warrant is similarly suspect, as it was previously
granted at a one-sided proceeding where the government carried a
171
low evidentiary burden.
Therefore, this Comment argues that
applying a clear and convincing standard of review would accomplish
two goals. First, it would convince the court for a second time that
the government has fully met its evidentiary burden or poke holes

168. See id. (stating that Awadallah’s continued detention was “reasonable under
the circumstances” where the circumstances relied on by the court included its
initial reasons to detain that were based “solely on the contents of Agent Plunkett’s
[the FBI agent] affidavit”). Awadallah could have had a colorable argument for
challenging his detention if his attorney had highlighted the contradicting
information.
169. See HRW REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 (raising the specter that the post-9/11
increased detention of material witnesses suggests that the government often held
witnesses who the government believed may have participated in terrorism directly as
opposed to only possessing information about terrorism); Klein & Wittes, supra note
13, at 139–40.
170. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (suggesting that courts can deal with excessive
deference, which often leads to pretextual detention, by raising the standards used to
determine whether a material witness actually poses a flight risk). In Awadallah, if
the Second Circuit had applied a heightened standard of review, then it could only
have authorized Awadallah’s continued detention based on express findings by the
government showing why Awadallah posed a flight risk. Id. at 36.
171. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (noting
that in the equal protection context, the conclusory statement offered by the state
alleging the existence of racial discrimination requires careful and heightened
scrutiny as opposed to a remedy founded on a respective statute’s clear legislative
purpose); see also Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 197, 201 (describing that material
witnesses are subject to arrest and detention based exclusively on the government’s
evidence, offered ex parte).
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where it has not, and second, it would separate instances of pretext
172
from legitimate cases of prolonged detention.
As Croson illuminates, heightened judicial review helps to smoke
out pretext because by applying heightened scrutiny, the court
exposes the government’s findings to a searching judicial inquiry into
whether it offered concrete reasons for treating a class of individuals
in a certain way rather than the court relying on a statement that the
173
measures the government used are benign.
Similarly, applying
searching judicial inquiry at hearings on motions to quash material
witness warrants would give the court a chance to evaluate the
underlying material witness warrant with a more critical eye than the
judge who previously granted the warrant in an expedited ex parte
174
hearing.
In material witness cases, the government often claims that a
witness continues to be material to criminal proceedings and yet fails
175
to call the witness or explain the delay.
Doing so suggests either
that the witness was being held, pending individual investigation, or
that the witness’s materiality and impracticability had been
176
exaggerated.
The government likely overstates its case or fails to
provide an explanation for not calling a witness because doing so
facilitates prolonged detention without necessarily requiring further
investigation into whether it is necessary, arguably an administrative
172. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(requiring the government to show through clear and convincing evidence at the
material witness’s hearing that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably secure the witness’s appearance at a pending criminal proceeding to
ensure that the witness is only held for testimony and not for individual criminal
investigation).
173. See id. (discussing that in the equal protection context, the Court applies
strict scrutiny because doing so helps identify instances where the state is
implementing race-based remedial measures, and arguing that such measures are
authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment but never specifically showing why and
how that is so).
174. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (describing that courts can
appropriately require clear and convincing evidence from the unilaterally
represented party to provide an additional safeguard to the otherwise unrepresented
party).
By implication, if the clear and convincing standard protects the
unrepresented party at the initial determination, it follows that those interests would
similarly be protected by using the same standard upon review. See In re Det. of
Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (demanding the same standard of clear
and convincing evidence for insanity and dangerousness when authorizing the initial
involuntary commitment upon review of confinement).
175. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting that the material witness was never called to testify before the grand jury
despite the court granting the government’s request for prolonged detention).
176. See id. at 359 (explaining that rather than present the witness to the grand
jury, the government instead charged the witness with making “material false
statements” for denying that the witness possessed the radio transceiver, which
arguably calls into question the materiality and impracticability of the witness).
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177

convenience to the government.
Moreover, extending a witness’s
detention may also give the government a chance to establish
178
probable cause to charge the witness with a crime.
Reviewing a material witness warrant under a relatively relaxed
level of scrutiny can lead to unnecessarily prolonged detention or to
179
pretextual use of the material witness statute. However, heightened
review of materiality and impracticability can spare a material witness
180
from a prolonged detention. In both the equal protection and the
material witness contexts, courts can reach thoroughly reasoned
decisions that do not immediately credit the government’s assertions
181
by applying a heightened standard of judicial review. For example,
unlike Croson, where the Court rejected the city’s claim that its racebased measures helped remedy racial discrimination as overbroad,
the Second Circuit in Awadallah required more than a mere assertion
but nonetheless credited the government’s claim that specific facts in
the affidavit showing the FBI agent’s personal knowledge of the
materiality of Awadallah’s testimony was sufficient to prove
materiality rather than probing further into the facts that arguably
182
made Awadallah material to a criminal proceeding. In other cases
177. See supra notes 25, 59, 76 and accompanying text (describing instances where
the government held the material witness for extended periods, at least one of which
required multiple stages of review and continued approval by the court).
178. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 13–14 (noting that the DOJ prolonged
detention of material witnesses to investigate possible terrorist activity and that the
courts furthered this end by establishing a review procedure of material witness
warrants that amounted to a mere formality).
179. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (implying that because the affidavit underlying alKidd’s material witness warrant was devoid of any concrete showings of materiality
and impracticability, it is arguable that al-Kidd was held pretextually by the
government).
180. Id. (reasoning that if reviewing courts employed a more searching inquiry of
the government’s reasons supporting a witness’s materiality and impracticability, they
could avoid detention altogether or lessen its duration).
181. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–08 (1989)
(evaluating the City of Richmond’s set aside plan under strict scrutiny, which
required that the state demonstrate a compelling interest in having such a plan as
well as facts demonstrating that the plan was narrowly tailored); Awadallah II, 349
F.3d 42, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring specific facts tending to prove materiality
rather than accepting a “mere statement” of materiality by a government official
alone); see also Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 206–07 (commenting on how the
approach to materiality in Awadallah provides a more probing analysis than the Bacon
“mere statement” rule, which lacked constitutional requirements for findings of
particularity and an independent judicial determination).
182. Compare Croson, 488 U.S. at 498–99 (concluding that the city’s plan provided
no more than a generalized assertion of past discrimination in the construction
industry, which was insufficient to justify the proposed remedy), with Awadallah II,
349 F.3d at 65–66 (deciding that FBI Agent Plunkett’s assertions showing specific
involvement with the agents who personally dealt with Awadallah, coupled with
Agent Plunkett’s involvement in other indictments and convictions as part of an
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where the government repeatedly failed to call the material witness to
testify, if the reviewing court had applied a heightened standard of
review, it could have potentially avoided unnecessary extended
detainment by pressing the government for concrete reasons why the
witness had not yet been called to testify as well as the particular
183
reasons why it might be necessary to continue holding the witness.
Because both materiality and impracticability are fact-driven
assessments that are subject to change based on new information, the
government has an implied duty to continue making its case for
184
detention.
At the second hearing following Egyptian national
Higazy’s detention as a material witness after the government had
connected him to the radio transceiver, the court learned that the
government had not presented Higazy to the grand jury and required
the government to provide the court with further information
185
The court required this
justifying Higazy’s continued detention.
additional showing in recognition of its duty not to further detain a
186
material witness without an adequate basis for doing so.
Nonetheless, the court granted an extended detention based on what
187
was later discovered to be a false confession.
However, under a
clear and convincing evidence review of the material witness warrant,
the court would likely have discovered that the underlying confession
188
was false and obtained through coercion.
Alternatively, if the
government knew it would be held to a clear and convincing

ongoing investigation into the 9/11 attacks, sufficiently established materiality). The
Second Circuit greatly emphasized the personal knowledge element of Agent
Plunkett’s assertions in the affidavit, which may have imposed a stricter standard on
the government than the “mere statement” rule used by prior courts, and the court
subsequently decided that the government had established probable cause to find
Awadallah material based on Agent Plunkett’s representations. Awadallah II, 349
F.3d at 65–66, 69–70. Arguably, however, the court’s determination fell short of a
searching inquiry into whether a 9/11 hijacker’s possession of Awadallah’s phone
number along with Awadallah living close to one of the hijackers showed a
compelling enough reason to make Awadallah material to a criminal proceeding and
to warrant his continued arrest.
183. See Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(describing that material witness Higazy was not called to testify before a grand jury
despite being detained for multiple ten day intervals).
184. See, e.g., id. at 359 (requiring that the government provide the court with
further information, after the initial ten day period to hold and call witness Higazy
had passed, to see what, if any, new information may have surfaced to warrant further
detention).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir. 2007) (detailing that
Higazy admitted that he had lied during the confession); Material Witness No. 38, 214
F. Supp. 2d at 360 (indicating that Higazy’s counsel made allegations of the coercive
and deceptive nature in which the government obtained the confession).
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standard of review, it may have provided additional support showing
why the confession itself necessarily proved not only that Higazy was
material, but also that there were specific reasons why Higazy posed a
189
flight risk that warranted his continued detention.
As Higazy’s case illustrates, a relaxed standard of review allows a
reviewing court to assume that the government’s measures are in fact
designed to further the government’s stated goal, and thus, the court
190
fails to hold the government accountable. Even though remedying
racial discrimination or ensuring testimony at trial may serve the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause and the material witness
statute respectively, in both contexts the court cannot adequately
review the underlying measure “without first engaging in an
examination of the factual basis for its enactment and the nexus
191
between its scope and that factual basis . . . .”
Applying relaxed
scrutiny can lead to courts failing to engage in the kind of intense
examination of governmental purpose that courts would otherwise
192
exercise when reviewing race- or gender-based measures.
In the material witness context, when a court is singularly
deferential to the government’s position, it is at the expense of the
court’s independence and its valuable judicial resources that are
necessarily spent presiding over later proceedings when the court
193
discovers it has been misled.
However, the court’s independence
could be better preserved if the court scrutinized the warrant to
determine whether there is adequate support to uphold continuing
detention or whether the government should be required to present
194
new evidence indicating why further detention is necessary. Doing
189. See Stoller et al., supra note 25, at 206–07 (contrasting the court’s review of
Higazy’s warrant under the Bacon “mere statement” rule, where the court too readily
found materiality based on the representation of the prosecutor, to the more
probing Awadallah determination, which relied on factual statements).
190. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–95 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (illustrating that only a searching judicial inquiry will reveal the
motivations behind a government action).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 493.
193. See, e.g., Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 358–60 (explaining that
upon learning of the government’s misrepresentations, the court convened a
hearing to examine the extent of the misrepresentations regarding the discovery of
the transceiver and Higazy’s confession as to possessing it).
194. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2007) (establishing
that the government’s newly proffered evidence—showing that Higazy confessed to
owning the radio transceiver during the lie detector test—was sufficient to prolong
his detention even though it had been Higazy who had requested the polygraph).
The court previously entertained Higazy’s attorney’s request to grant the polygraph
because Higazy was “urgently desirous of taking a lie detector test,” which suggested
that Higazy did not own the radio transceiver and likely had been coerced into
admitting that he did. Id. at 165–66.
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so could avoid situations like that of Higazy, where subsequent
hearings exploring why and how the court had been misled lasted
195
nearly five months. The court might have spared valuable judicial
resources had it used a higher standard of review and required more
conclusive proof for prolonging Higazy’s detention because it could
have detected at an earlier point that, for example, Higazy had falsely
196
confessed to owning the radio transceiver.
Moreover, if the court’s role is to examine the congressional intent
behind a statute, then clear and convincing evidence can assist the
197
court in preserving this role.
Specifically, reviewing for clear and
convincing evidence would compel the court to require
particularized evidence of the materiality of a witness and the
impracticability of securing a subpoena, which is mandated under the
198
federal material witness statute.
Reviewing for clear and convincing evidence would allow courts to
recognize, as Justice Ginsburg did in al-Kidd, that simply because a
material witness warrant is “based on individualized suspicion,” it
does not follow that the government’s reasons for holding a witness
are insulated from scrutiny —particularly when the notion of
individualized suspicion tends to imply that the person has engaged
199
in wrongdoing.
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence implies that the
government often detains a witness not when it wishes to call him for
testimony but when the government intends to investigate the witness
further for individual wrongdoing —an end goal that is anathema to

195. Material Witness No. 38, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 356, 359–60 (recounting the fivemonth-long process of determining the root of the misrepresentations: initial court
hearing, December 18, 2001; subsequent hearing, December 28, 2001; telephonic
conference, January 2002; oral argument, March 2002; and court order, August
2002).
196. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (describing Higazy’s false
confession and explaining what the court could have done differently to avoid the
hearings inquiring into the government’s misrepresentations in Higazy’s case).
197. Senator Leahy’s proposed bill would amend the material witness statute to
ensure that the material witness law is “used only for the narrow purpose that
Congress originally intended, to obtain testimony, and not to hold criminal suspects
without charge when probable cause is lacking.” 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
198. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that courts might seriously inquire whether
the government intends to call the material witness and whether there is sufficient
information to hold the witness in order to avoid situations like al-Kidd’s). Justice
Ginsburg further opined that with a more thorough review of the spare affidavit, “alKidd might have been spared the entire [detention] ordeal.” Id.
199. See id. at 2088 n.3 (reasoning that “[m]aterial witness status does not
‘involve[e] suspicion, or lack of suspicion,’ of the individual so identified” (quoting
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004))).
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200

the statute.
Therefore, courts can safeguard their own
independence and the interests of material witnesses by employing a
clear and convincing standard of judicial review that critically reexamines the government’s reasons for detaining a material witness
201
and helps identify instances of pretextual detention.
C. Conducting Periodic Hearings Affords Material Witnesses the Requisite
Procedural Safeguards and Allows Courts To Continue Reviewing the
Government’s Reasons for Prolonged Detention Under Heightened Scrutiny
Periodic status hearings comport with the procedural protections
required by Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
can reduce the risk of erroneous prolonged detention by providing
increased judicial oversight of the government’s reasons for
202
continuing detention.
Because material witnesses hold significant
liberty interests, Congress intended to provide material witnesses with
the right to mandatory bi-weekly judicial review when these witnesses
203
are detained for an extended period of time.
Periodic status
hearings can additionally provide a material witness another avenue
to challenge his detention and question whether he is being held for
204
individual investigation.
Thus, even if a court finds that the
200. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,942–43 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(explaining that following 9/11, the government used the material witness statute for
other ends — namely to detain people suspected of criminal activity for which
probable cause had not been established).
201. See supra notes 190–91, 198 and accompanying text (illustrating that review of
materiality and impracticability under heightened scrutiny should operate by
providing specific examples where courts based the decision to grant a material
witness warrant on factual information noting a particular risk of flight or inability to
serve a subpoena).
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2); see also Material Witness Warrant for John Doe, 213
F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that Rule 46 requires courts to
continually monitor a material witness’s prolonged detention by holding bi-weekly
status hearings to eliminate unnecessary detention wherever possible); In re Arnold,
292 S.W.3d 393, 396–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (describing that a clear and convincing
standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard sufficiently meets the
constitutional requirements needed to protect sex offenders because it affords the
court with continuing opportunities to review the offender’s civil commitment, thus
ensuring a reduced risk of error).
203. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 advisory committee’s note (explaining that in 1966,
Congress added subsection (h) to Rule 46 to supervise and eliminate all unnecessary
detention of defendants and witnesses). In 2002, Congress amended the language to
remove the protection for defendants who were otherwise covered by the Speedy
Trial Act, but kept the language in for material witnesses because they fall into a class
that warrants additional protection. Id.
204. See Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 410 (6th Cir. 2011) (providing that
“material witnesses may petition for habeas corpus relief or move to quash their
arrest warrants”). Accordingly, both procedural devices can be used as forums for
raising the issue of pretextual detention. Id.; see also 109th Cong. § 1 (d)(2)(A),
(d)(3)(A)–(C) (2005) (outlining the multiple instances where a material witness
could periodically challenge detention under the proposed bill).

CONE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

374

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/14/2013 12:48 PM

[Vol. 62:333

underlying material witness warrant is valid, a detainee can still argue
at a status hearing or a habeas corpus proceeding that he is being
205
held pretextually under Rule 46.
206
Periodic hearings not only provide an opportunity to challenge
the government’s motive, but also give courts the ability to engage in
a balancing test that weighs the interests of the state in having
individuals testify against the interests of the witness in not being
unreasonably detained, or being detained using only the least
207
Moreover, courts can strike the proper balance
restrictive means.
between these competing interests at periodic hearings because they
can delve into whether the government has actually attempted to
secure testimony by deposition, as well as determine whether
detention is the only means possible to secure the witness’s
208
testimony.
Additionally, periodic hearings allow the court to
consider other factors that may be relevant to whether the witness is
being held pretextually. First, courts can consider how material the
testimony really is, including whether the witness’s testimony is
cumulative. Second, courts can review the length of proposed
detention— the longer the detention, the greater the showing
required by the state to justify it. Third, courts can assess the harm to
the witness and the witness’s family, including lost wages and missed
205. See, e.g., Adams, 656 F.3d at 410 (implying that material witnesses are not
foreclosed from arguing improper motive at a Rule 46 or habeas corpus hearing). A
habeas corpus proceeding, in particular, allows the presiding court to release a
material witness if the witness is able to show that his detainment met certain
conditions. Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the Detention
of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 681, 692 & n.60 (2009).
206. From this point forward in this Comment, “periodic hearings” encompass
both status hearings under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 and habeas
corpus proceedings, while “status hearings” refers only to Rule 46 hearings
throughout Part II.C.
207. In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 805 (Ct. App. 2001) (reasoning that
because of the material witness’s unique position, he has the right to not be
“unreasonably detained” and thus procedural safeguards must allow the interests of
the witness to be heard with the interests of the state). The court went on to indicate
that determining whether and how long to detain a witness cannot be determined by
applying “mechanical rules” given the important right at stake. Id. at 805. In
conducting a balancing test, the court discussed taking a common sense approach
that considers the interest of the witness as well as the interests of the prosecution
and the defendant in the underlying criminal proceeding for which the witness’s
testimony is needed. Id. at 806.
208. See id. at 805 (noting that the government must show that it is necessary to
hold the witness based on a good cause belief that the witness will not appear and
testify, unless a more restrictive means is used to guarantee the witness’s future
testimony). The court should also consider any relevant change in circumstances
when assessing whether less restrictive means are appropriate, including whether the
witness has changed his attitude toward testifying or toward accepting other
alternatives to custody, because such changes would suggest that means other than
prolonged detention are appropriate. Id. at 808.
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classes. Fourth, the court can consider the witness’s financial
resources, particularly in setting bail. Fifth, courts may evaluate other
209
alternatives to incarceration.
1. The bi-weekly reporting requirement of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure allows a court to continue challenging the government’s
reasons for prolonging the detention of an allegedly material witness
Rule 46 affords material witnesses additional opportunities to
screen for improper motive when the government prolongs
witnesses’ detentions because Rule 46 requires the government to
report bi-weekly to the court its reasons for holding any material
210
Moreover, courts
witness rather than releasing or deposing him.
reviewing prolonged material witness detention are entitled to
demand from the government the kind of showing that ensures a
211
material witness is detained no longer than necessary.
To ensure
that material witnesses are held under the least restrictive means, a
court can press the government for clear and convincing evidence
demonstrating that it took specific measures to secure the witness’s
testimony by deposition or that the witness continues to pose a flight
212
risk.
Consequently, to effectively scrutinize unnecessary delay on
the government’s part, the court may incrementally increase the
evidentiary standard that the government must meet: The longer the
witness is held, the greater the encroachment on the witness’s liberty
213
interest.
When used properly, Rule 46 can provide an effective mechanism
for challenging improper motive when the reviewing court authorizes
continued detention based only on the government’s attempts to

209. Id. at 806–07.
210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(h)(1)–(2); see also supra notes 202–05 and accompanying
text (discussing the compulsory nature of the Rule 46 bi-weekly reporting
requirement and its additional protections, which are not similarly afforded to other
detained individuals); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006) (affording certain classes of
prisoners the right to a writ of habeas corpus without additionally providing later
opportunities for continuing reviewing of their detention).
211. Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (outlining the protections for a
material witness against unnecessary prolonged detainment found in the federal
material witness statute and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46).
212. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 62–63; see also 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (asking courts reviewing a material witness’s
detention to only authorize prolonged detention if the government shows that the
witness poses a flight risk through clear and convincing evidence).
213. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (stating that the longer a witness
is held in detention, the more substantial the justification needed from the
government to warrant the extended delay).
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214

compel testimony or prove flight risk.
In Awadallah, the Second
Circuit found that the witness’s detention was reasonable even
though he was held for twenty days prior to giving testimony because
Awadallah received adequate process to ensure he was not detained
215
longer than necessary. However, the lower court could have found
Awadallah’s detention unreasonable if it had used the clear and
convincing standard to review the government’s reasons for
prolonged detention, as that standard requires finding more than a
216
reasonable probability that Awadallah would flee.
By requiring a
higher burden of proof that a detainee could be a flight risk, the
court could have checked the sufficiency of the government’s
arguments; likewise, in civil detention cases, courts use a higher
burden of proof requiring more than just a few isolated instances of
217
unusual conduct before involuntarily committing an individual.
Applying that standard to Awadallah’s case, the court could have
required clear and convincing evidence of how his family ties would
create a flight risk or pressed for evidence of a pattern of
uncooperativeness to minimize any possible erroneous determination
218
prolonging Awadallah’s detention.
Drawing further on the civil detention context, courts review
individual commitments of sexual offenders based on clear and
convincing evidence at annual show cause hearings following the
214. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 62 (noting that Rule 46 allows the court to
question whether Awadallah was properly detained when held for several weeks
without being allowed to give his deposition or obtain release).
215. See id. at 63 (finding the conditions of Awadallah’s detention reasonable).
The court determined Awadallah was not unreasonably detained based on the
following: (1) Awadallah appeared before a magistrate judge for a bail hearing the
first business day after his arrest; (2) his attorney’s request to provide Awadallah’s
testimony by deposition was denied only because Awadallah was impracticable to
secure by subpoena; (3) Awadallah received a second bail hearing the following day
after being transported to New York; (4) his request for release was denied again, but
only after a finding that there was no way to prevent Awadallah from leaving New
York before he would be summoned for grand jury testimony there; and (5)
Awadallah was called for testimony the first business day the grand jury convened.
Id.
216. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2088 n.2 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (indicating that lower courts should evaluate material
witness warrants based on clear, concrete, and particularized findings of materiality
and impracticability, which by definition would require proof beyond a reasonable
probability).
217. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d at 63 (observing that the lower court’s
determination that Awadallah was a flight risk was made without providing concrete
reasons); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–27 (1979) (stating that the
significant loss of liberty associated with involuntary commitment for a mentally ill
person mandates a greater showing of illness than merely idiosyncratic behavior).
218. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 (explaining that clear and convincing evidence
reduces the chances that inappropriate and erroneous involuntary commitments will
be ordered).
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standards of proof the Supreme Court established for involuntary
219
commitments in Addington. Because the interests of the committed
individual remain the same upon review, the state accordingly
continues to bear the burden of proof at the annual show cause
220
hearing. Similarly, a material witness’s liberty interest remains the
221
Consequently, material
same throughout the witness’s detention.
witnesses, like their civil detention counterparts, should be entitled to
periodic review of their detention under the same clear and
222
convincing standard.
Given that the reviewing district court has discretion to determine
whether continued detention is justified, the range of outcomes
resulting from material witness hearings is subject to what the
223
reviewing court determines as sufficient evidence of flight risk.
Therefore, the protections afforded by any periodic hearing are only
224
To ensure
as strong as the level of scrutiny applied by the court.
that material witnesses are afforded the greatest protection in
challenging their prolonged detention and screening for pretext,

219. See supra notes 124–25, 133 and accompanying text (discussing that courts
apply the Foucha and Addington clear and convincing standard to the determination
of whether to extend a sexual offender’s involuntary commitment at an annual show
cause hearing).
220. See In re Det. of Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 813–14 (Wash. 1999) (implying that the
due process liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence of insanity and
dangerousness authorizing the initial involuntary commitment equally apply upon
review of confinement).
221. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing the material witness’s
significant liberty interest).
222. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(advocating for the clear and convincing standard used in the civil detention context
to be established for material witness detention hearings).
223. See Awadallah II, 349 F.3d 42, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2003) (contemplating the
sufficiency of the magistrate and district court’s findings regarding why Awadallah
posed a flight risk, thus suggesting that evidence of flight risk can outweigh the
continued detention’s intrusion on liberty). The court found that the magistrate’s
initial findings were justified because the magistrate analyzed Awadallah’s
impracticability through a number of factors, including his family, employment,
community ties, and financial resources. Id. at 63 n.15. Similarly, the court found
the district court’s determination to deny Awadallah’s release to be reasonable and
necessary when the judge relied on specific facts in the government’s application
showing that Awadallah had possible incentive to leave; a determination of
reasonableness suggests that no method other than detention could secure his
presence before a grand jury. Id. at 63.
224. See Cole, supra note 148, at 722 (implying that because there is no reason to
justify delaying testimony of a material witness, a court should demand no less than
good cause for such a delay). Cole argues for the good cause standard in seeking a
presumptive time limit on detention. Id. Applying the good cause requirement to an
evidentiary standard could equate to clear and convincing following Senator Leahy’s
approach in his bill to revamp the federal material witness statute. See 151 CONG. REC.
20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (suggesting that courts should review
prolonged detention under a clear and convincing evidence standard).
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witnesses should receive periodic review based on clear and
225
convincing evidence.
2. Periodic hearings provide the court with the ability to consider alternative,
less-restrictive methods of detention
Courts can require the government to implement the least
restrictive means for detention at periodic hearings taking into
account both the important governmental interest and the interests
226
of the witness. Specifically, at a status hearing, the government can
appropriately raise concerns about a witness fleeing prior to
providing testimony and the court can consider granting electronic
227
monitoring of a witness as a less restrictive means.
Moreover,
habeas corpus proceedings allow the presiding court to release a
material witness where the witness is able to show that he has been
228
detained under certain conditions.
In facilitating the least restrictive detention possible, courts
reviewing material witness detention can look to Croson for parallel
guidance. In Croson, the Court noted how the City of Richmond had
at its disposal an array of race-neutral mechanisms it could use to
increase minority accessibility to city contracting opportunities, and
therefore its quota system was not the most narrowly-tailored means
229
of achieving its goal. Similarly, in the material witness context, the
government can use depositions, electronic monitoring, and speedy
presentment of material witnesses for testimony, particularly at grand
jury indictments that by nature are expedited proceedings, to ensure

225. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text (describing the additional
evidence that came to light during Higazy’s detention hearings, evidence that the
court might have discovered earlier if it had initially required clear and convincing
proof from the government).
226. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794, 806–07 (Ct. App. 2001)
(suggesting that courts can consider granting less restrictive means of detaining a
material witness such as electronic monitoring while simultaneously considering the
government’s interests in securing witness testimony).
227. Id.
228. Ramsey, supra note 205, at 692 n.60. Courts have released material witnesses
by granting habeas corpus petitions in particular circumstances: where a witness was
held for ninety days without adequate explanation for the continuances; where the
witness was held without a sufficient showing of flight risk or materiality proving that
his testimony was needed for a specific criminal case, aside from a trumped-up “John
Doe” case filed to facilitate his detention; and where the witness had been detained
for five months in county jail and had not received a hearing nor been separated
from those charged with or convicted of a crime. Id.
229. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
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that witnesses are held for only as long as necessary and only under
230
the least restrictive means possible.
D. Material Witnesses Are Best Protected When Courts Defer Less to the
Government, When Their Attorneys Request Continuing Review of Prolonged
Detention, and When the Government Requires Clear and Convincing
Standards in Its Material Witness Detention Practice
To stop the government’s practice of detaining material witnesses
based on pretext, courts should refrain from overly deferring to
231
government interests,
which necessarily leads to the almost
232
guaranteed granting of material witness warrants.
Additionally,
lawyers advocating for material witness clients should avail themselves
of checks on prosecutorial and general governmental abuse by
appealing continued detention as much as possible, questioning
underlying material witness warrants at status hearings, using habeas
corpus proceedings, and raising motions to quash underlying
233
material witness warrants. Both periodic status hearings and habeas
corpus proceedings would serve as critical safeguards for material
witnesses because at either hearing the court would be required to
release any material witness who is held without a showing that the
detainee poses a flight risk or that the witness’s testimony is needed
234
For these reasons, courts should
for a specific criminal case.
undertake additional hearings to continually review the status of
material witnesses, and material witnesses should move for habeas
235
corpus relief and periodic judicial review as much as possible.
230. See In re Francisco M., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806–07 (discussing the host of
alternative means available to the government to properly hold material witnesses
and create the least amount of intrusion on the witness’s liberty interest).
231. See Parker, supra note 54, at 28 (illustrating that the Second Circuit judges
“allowed great deference to the government’s claims that the material witnesses
posed a threat to national security,” thus justifying their continued detention).
232. See Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (granting Higazy’s
continued detention despite the government’s weak showing); Awadallah II, 349 F.3d
42, 66–69 (2d Cir. 2003) (authorizing Awadallah’s detention despite
misrepresentations in the government’s material witness warrant application).
233. See Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397, 410 (6th Cir. 2011) (listing various checks
to prosecutorial power through the judicial process available to people being
detained as material witnesses).
234. See, e.g., In re Lewellyn, 62 N.W. 554, 554 (Mich. 1895) (per curiam)
(releasing the material witness where the witness was held for an excessively long
period and had never received a hearing or been properly segregated from the
general prison population to account for his material witness status); In re
Prestigiacomo, 255 N.Y.S. 289, 290–91 (App. Div. 1932) (ordering the material
witness’s release where the court found no adequate evidence of flight risk).
235. See Adams, 656 F.3d at 410 (stating that petitioning for habeas corpus relief or
moving to quash material arrest warrants are safeguards material witnesses may avail
themselves of when challenging their detention).
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Complementing the in-court advocacy, the government can
evaluate and, where necessary, develop new and higher standards
concerning what constitutes a sufficient and credible showing of a
material witness warrant application, and subsequently, the
government can provide follow-up training on the new standards for
236
staff responsible for securing material witness warrants. If held to a
higher standard, the government would be incentivized to make
concrete findings rather than consistently have its material witness
warrant applications denied by courts. Moreover, implementing
higher standards on the front end would also avoid the cost and use
of resources required to make subsequent applications to courts
denying material witness warrant applications based on scant
evidentiary showings. Lastly, Congress should consider replacing the
material witness statute with a new statute, similar to the one
proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy in 2005, that demands higher
standards as to materiality and impracticability, preferably through
237
clear and convincing evidence.
Any amendment to the federal
material witness statute should similarly require increased and more
thorough judicial review of material witness warrants and the need
238
for prolonged detention.
These efforts would help preserve a
material witness’s individual liberty and help increase the
government’s accountability in the ever-expansive realm of material
witness detention.
CONCLUSION
The federal material witness statute’s purpose is to allow the
government to detain a material witness only where the witness is
both material and impracticable. Therefore, courts should review
material witness warrant applications under a clear and convincing
standard following civil detention cases because such a standard
requires showing more than a reasonable probability that the witness
is both material to a criminal proceeding and impracticable to secure
236. FBI Releases Guiding Principles on Training, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION NEWS
BLOG,
http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/fbi-releases-guiding-principles-on-training
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (discussing the FBI’s newest guiding principles on training,
mirroring the DOJ’s recently developed training guidance). Counterterrorism
training was among the types of training reviewed by the FBI, suggesting that both
the DOJ and FBI could similarly institute training on how to properly follow
heightened standards for material witness warrants. Id.
237. See 151 CONG. REC. 20,943 (2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
recommending that courts require clear and convincing showings of materiality and
impracticability and regularly engage in periodic judicial review of whether
prolonged detention of any witness is necessary).
238. See id.
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by any means other than arrest. By using the clear and convincing
standard, material witnesses would have a higher chance of avoiding
pretextual detention because courts would be more likely to discover
if the government is trying to hold a witness for individual
investigation rather than for testimony in a future criminal
proceeding. Moreover, the clear and convincing standard used in
civil detention cases is specifically designed to protect an important
liberty interest. Applying this reasoning to the material witness
context, higher evidentiary showings would facilitate greater
protection of the material witness’s interest in not being
unreasonably detained.
However, even where a material witness is arrested— a still
somewhat probable result given the ex parte nature of the initial
proceeding—a court can still reassess the validity of the material
witness warrant under the same heightened standard of scrutiny.
Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard when reviewing
material witness warrants and prolonged detention would necessarily
require the government to repeatedly prove continued materiality of
the witness to an upcoming criminal proceeding and continued risk
of flight, such that requires prolonged detention. Furthermore, clear
and convincing evidence would require reviewing courts to not overly
defer to the interests of the government, and in turn allow courts to
more readily identify instances where the government is pretextually
holding a witness. Consequently, using heightened judicial review
would provide material witnesses the ability to directly challenge the
government’s motive within the federal material witness statute’s
framework. Lastly, even if the court is satisfied with the government’s
showings as to the warrant, courts can prescribe or the witness can
petition for periodic hearings under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as through writs of habeas corpus, to
further press the government into showing why the witness
necessarily poses a flight risk and what diligent efforts it is taking to
hold the witness under the least restrictive means possible.
While using the clear and convincing standard in all stages of
material witness proceedings might not serve as a full-proof bulwark
against pretextual detention, it would go a long way to afford material
witnesses the greatest protection possible. Moreover, reading higher
standards of proof and review into the federal material witness statute
would help ensure that the statute is used only for its originally
intended purpose.

